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THE EXPRESSIVE IMPACT OF PATENTS 
TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Patents represent a quid pro quo between the public and the inventor: 
in exchange for disclosing the invention, the inventor receives the right to 
exclude others from practicing her invention. They therefore serve as a 
source of technical information. Patents also communicate information to 
markets and companies that serve to reduce various transaction costs, 
allowing more efficient transactions and investment. Patents consequently 
communicate various types of information beyond the technical. 
There is no reason, however, that such messages must be limited to the 
technical or the pecuniary. This Article explores whether patents, like 
other governmental acts such as legislation, can create expressive harms. 
The grant of a patent could communicate a message of inferiority to 
groups whose identity is tied to their biology. The article analyzes this 
potential through the paradigm of granting patents on a “gay gene” or 
other biological process that predisposes a person toward a homosexual 
orientation. Other conditions implicated by my thesis are the deaf, dwarfs, 
and high-functioning autistics. These groups do not regard themselves as 
pathological or in need of “curing,” yet genetic discoveries offer the 
potential for their elimination through what is effectively privatized 
eugenics. The grant of a patent on such technologies affords the 
government’s imprimatur of such controversial technologies.  
The Article first reviews the scientific status of homosexuality. It then 
explores whether patents regarding sexual orientation could be a moral 
signal of inferiority by the government by suggesting that gays and 
lesbians are pathological. Finally, the Article offers various prescriptions 
to address this problem.  
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What may be considered normal for one individual may be 
decidedly abnormal for another; and who is there among us who 
can decide which of the two is normal and which abnormal?1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patents traditionally have been justified on the basis of incentives. 
Commentators have identified three different incentive systems that 
underlie the patent system: quid pro quo, ex ante, and prospect theories. 
Under the quid pro quo view, the patent acts as an incentive for the 
innovator to disclose the invention to the public in exchange for the 
patent’s exclusive rights.2 On the most basic level, the patent’s disclosure 
communicates a message to the public about what the inventor has 
discovered and how to make and use that discovery.3 According to the ex 
ante incentive view, patents are needed to combat the “public good 
problem of information”, namely, without patents, competitors could free-
ride on the invention and compete with the innovator without incurring the 
research and development costs.4 Such free-riding reduces the ex ante 
incentive to invest in innovation. The third view, prospect theory, contends 
that patents create the incentive to commercialize the invention after the 
patent has issued.5 By defining the property right surrounding the 
invention, the inventor can best coordinate later commercialization of the 
good in a way akin to prospecting of mineral rights.6 
Recent scholarship has persuasively challenged these paradigmatic 
views and has demonstrated that patents perform functions far different 
from these basic incentives. Patents can operate as a vehicle for 
transmitting messages. For example, patents can serve as a signal to 
markets about aspects of the firm. A robust, diverse collection of patents, 
known as a patent portfolio, can send a signal to the market about the 
 
 
 1. Abraham L. Wolbarst, Sexual Perversions: Their Medical and Social Implications, 134 MED. 
J. & REC. 5, 5 (1931), quoted in ERIN G. CARLSTON, “A Finer Differentiation”: Female 
Homosexuality and the American Medical Community, 1926–1940, in SCIENCE AND 
HOMOSEXUALITIES 175, 184 (Vernon A. Rosario ed., 1997). 
 2. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 125 (2006). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). For a general discussion of disclosure obligations and various 
structural flaws in the patent system that mitigate its ability to serve as a source of technical 
information, see Holbrook, supra note 2, at 131–46.  
 4. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 129, 129 (2004); see also Holbrook, supra note 2, at 132–35. 
 5. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1977). 
 6. Id.  
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nature of a firm’s innovation capacity or other factors relevant to potential 
investors.7 Signaling and portfolio theory both suggest that patents act as 
intermediaries, translating otherwise complicated information into simpler 
forms to allow the markets to operate more efficiently. Patents 
communicate other information in order to reduce transaction costs: they 
can facilitate affirmative asset partitioning by firms and combat “team 
production” problems arising in efforts by firms to develop and exploit 
information assets.8 Patents consequently serve a far greater 
communicative role than simply revealing the technical information 
regarding the invention and the scope of the exclusionary rights.  
This reality is not surprising. Property rights often involve issues of 
communication, messages, and symbols.9 The need for notice of property 
rights among parties necessitates a common language of communication 
and expression of ownership rights and their parameters.10 Property rights 
are more than simply the ability to exclude others. In order for property 
rights to function efficiently, others must be able to recognize the scope of 
those rights and understand what is and is not permitted. Conflicts and 
litigation can arise when two parties do not understand the messages 
communicated by property rights. If someone does not understand that a 
fence means “do not enter,” she may not realize that it is impermissible to 
enter the property. Similarly, customs of a given community can afford 
quasi-property rights, which can easily be misunderstood by outsiders. The 
messages and signals consequently are necessary elements of any 
functioning property system. 
Patents, as a form of property, undeniably act in ways to facilitate 
signaling and communication beyond their disclosures, but they differ 
from other forms of property in a significant way: they are granted by the 
U.S. government after a substantive review of an application. An inventor 
must demonstrate that she has satisfied the patentability requirements11 
 
 
 7. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 636–37 (2002); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2005). 
 8. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 480–99 
(2005).  
 9. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 610 
(1988) (discussing how property rules implicate community communications); Carol M. Rose, 
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 83–85 (1985) [hereinafter Rose, 
Possession]. 
 10. Rose, Possession, supra note 9, at 84–85; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, 
Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003). 
 11. The PTO will grant a patent if the invention is of eligible subject matter, has utility, is novel, 
and is nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2000). The inventor’s application also must adequately 
disclose the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  
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and is thus entitled to a patent, which the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) confirms by issuing the patent. The fact that the 
patent is a grant of a right by the government enhances the signal of the 
patent document. The government’s imprimatur helps to convey the signal 
with greater clarity and confidence. The patent has credibility behind it 
because of the government’s imprimatur.12 Unlike other forms of property, 
therefore, the signal from a patent is necessarily intermingled with 
expressions of the government’s approval. 
There is no reason that these signals are limited to technical and 
pecuniary considerations, as the previous literature suggests.13 The 
government imprimatur attending the patent grant can confirm the 
technical and, potentially, moral legitimacy of a technology.14 In 
particular, the genetic revolution has resulted in discoveries linking genes, 
proteins, and other biological processes to human behavior generally.15 
Research into biological causes of behaviors is inevitable and, indeed, has 
already begun.16 Recent discoveries include genes that influence 
aggressiveness,17 weight,18 intelligence,19 novelty-seeking, worry20 and 
harm avoidance.21 One scientist has noted that “[t]he real breakthroughs in 
understanding personality are not occurring on leather couches but in 
laboratories.”22 Another has suggested that “[t]he genetic analysis of 
behavior will prove to be . . . the most important advance in the behavioral 
 
 
 12. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent 
Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 475–76 (2003); Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and 
Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 676 (2004). 
 13. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 14. Lee, supra note 12, at 676. 
 15. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES: WHY THEY MATTER MORE 
THAN YOU THINK 301 (1998) [hereinafter HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING] (“What often goes unsaid is 
that the genes being discovered also include ones that define behavior. Virtually every aspect of how 
we act and feel that has been studied in twins shows genetic influence, and many of the individual 
genes have been isolated.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of 
Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 320 (1992).  
 16. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 24 (2002) (“But it seems almost inevitable 
that we will know much more about genetic causation [of behaviors] even if we never fully understand 
how behavior is formed.”); DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE 187 (1994) 
[hereinafter HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE] (“The discovery of a genetic link to homosexuality is 
bound to be followed by discoveries of links to countless other aspects of personality.”).  
 17. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,165,716 (filed Sept. 3, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,418,162 (filed 
Oct. 14, 1992). 
 18. HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 9. 
 19. Id. at 10. 
 20. Id. at 11. 
 21. Id. at 55. 
 22. Id. at 25. 
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sciences in [his] lifetime.”23 Many of these discoveries are patentable, and 
the government grant of a patent on these technologies could signal 
approbation of such technologies. Although patents relating to genetically 
based diseases are desirable, patents on genes and processes that influence 
behaviors, activities, or conditions that are not clearly harmful could be 
problematic.24 These discoveries may result in the ability to manipulate or 
choose preferential traits, a form of privatized eugenics.25 The PTO 
inevitably will grant patents on biological discoveries with such eugenic 
potential. The imprimatur of the patent grant can express the view that 
such technologies are legitimate and normatively good. Moreover, patents 
in these areas beg the question of whether we want the patent system to 
create an incentive for these types of discoveries.  
Much of this debate centers on the requirement that a patented 
invention have utility. Patents are awarded only for inventions that are 
useful. Utility, however, is a relative concept: what is good for one could 
be destructive to another. This concern is particularly acute for groups 
whose identities are tied to their biological state or behaviors: the 
invention could be used to destroy these groups by “curing” them or by 
preventing their birth through prenatal screening. The grant of patents on 
these technologies confirms that the government views them favorably and 
could express that these groups are highly disfavored, further 
marginalizing them.  
The expressive dimension of intellectual property has been explored 
previously in trademark law26 but not in patent law. The Lanham Act 
proscribes granting federal trademark registration to a mark that is 
 
 
 23. Richard C. Pillard, The Search for a Genetic Influence on Sexual Orientation, in SCIENCE 
AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 226, 237 (Vernon A. Rosario ed., 1997). 
 24. Admittedly, what constitutes a “disease” is infected with the public’s view of undesirability. 
SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE 213–14 (1996) [hereinafter LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE] (“[V]alues are 
intrinsic to the definition of disease. Most especially, it has been claimed that a key feature of a disease 
is its undesirability, although opinions differ as to by whom and for whom . . . the disease is judged 
undesirable.”). 
 25. See generally Sarah M. Markwood, Comment, Creating a Perfect Human Is Not So Perfect: 
The Case For Restricting Genetic Enhancement Research, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 473 (2005). 
 26. Copyright, arguably the intellectual property right most closely associated with expression, 
ironically does not encounter these types of problems. For one, at least in the United States, copyright 
must coincide with the First Amendment. Denial of copyright protection based on expressive content 
could violate free speech protections. Second, and more importantly from an expressive perspective, 
copyrights are further removed from state action because the copyright is created the instant the 
original work is created. While a copyright can be registered with the Copyright Office, such 
registration is not required for the grant of the copyright. The government need not review the work to 
determine whether it satisfies the conditions of originality. Given this distance from governmental 
action, the idea that a copyright could convey an expressive message with respect to governmental 
views of a group is not well founded.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/2
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immoral or scandalous.27 Denying registration does not require the 
applicant to stop using the mark and therefore does not preclude use of the 
mark. Instead, denial merely creates a disincentive for the owner to 
continue using the mark due to the lack of protection. But that is not a 
strong disincentive—nothing prohibits the applicant from continuing to 
use the mark. Indeed, if a company has already invested considerable 
resources into promoting the mark, the company likely will continue to 
use it. The primary reason for denying the trademark registration in this 
context, therefore, is the potential that the government would be viewed as 
approving of such a scandalous mark.28 The concern of the government 
sending the wrong message is purely an expressive consideration.29 
This Article argues that patents also possess the potential to express 
governmental preferences for, disfavor towards, or even condemnation of 
various members of society. The recent discoveries into human biology 
portend discoveries that relate to various conditions that are central to a 
person’s identity. The deaf, for example, do not view their condition as a 
pathological condition in need of curing: to them, they are simply a 
linguistic minority. Similar concerns have been expressed by others, such 
as high-functioning autistics and little people. Patents on discoveries 
related to such conditions would communicate the message that “curing”30 
 
 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000). 
 28. Although the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has denied that registration can act as 
providing government imprimatur, see In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 
1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (rejecting as erroneous the “concern that the issuance of a trademark 
registration for applicant’s mark amounts to the awarding of the U.S. Government’s ‘imprimatur’ to 
the mark”), it has provided no other policy or theoretical justification for this exclusion. The lack of a 
justification begs the question of why the “immoral” or “scandalous” restriction is in the Lanham Act. 
The TTAB has hidden behind its role of applying the statutory requirements but does not explain why 
the requirements, as a policy matter, are there in the first place. The legislative history suggests that 
Congress wanted to discourage the use of such marks. Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on 
Trademarks of the H. Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 18 (1939) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of 
Rep. Thomas E. Robertson); see also Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the 
Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must A Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 22 
(1994). Denying registration, though, does not prevent a mark’s use. Thus, the only conceivable basis 
is to avoid giving the “stamp of approval” of an immoral or scandalous mark through the granting of a 
federal right. Cf. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION: 
LAW & POLICY 330–31 (2004). 
 29. For a discussion of trademark law’s implications for the queer community, see generally 
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: 
Section 2(a) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 191 
(2005). 
 30. I place the word “cure” in quotation because, to these groups, it is condescending. I use the 
term merely for rhetorical force to demonstrate the stigmatization such language can cause these 
groups. 
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these people would be normatively good, further marginalizing these 
groups.  
One particular group whose trait is increasingly shown to be 
biologically related has already borne the brunt of societal and expressive 
marginalization: gays and lesbians. Recent scientific studies have 
demonstrated that homosexuality is undoubtedly influenced by biology, 
even if it is not biologically determined in all cases.31 A likely result of 
such research into the origins of sexual orientation would be the 
formulation of methods to “cure” gays and lesbians.32 An even more likely 
scenario would be a pre-natal screen that would estimate the likelihood 
that the fetus would be gay, permitting termination of the pregnancy33 or 
perhaps consumption of a pill to reduce the likelihood of bearing a gay 
child.34  
Patents resulting from the quest to find the “gay gene” or other 
biological origins of homosexuality have the potential to express moral 
condemnation of gays and lesbians. Although a patent relating to sexual 
orientation or the alteration of such orientation has yet to issue, at least one 
researcher in this field has confirmed his intent to pursue patent protection 
on such a discovery.35  
 
 
 31. See, e.g., Brian S. Mustanski et al., A Genomewide Scan of Male Sexual Orientation, 116 
HUM. GENETICS 272, 272–73 (2005). 
 32. As Dean Hamer notes humorously: “Another danger is that we will medicalize normal 
human behavior and variations . . . . What about that pesky gay gene? Spray it away with new 
‘Straight-in-a-Day!’” HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 304. 
 33. Id. at 85 (“Hanging over the entire field of genetics has been the specter of eugenics—that is, 
the deliberate breeding of people for certain selected heritable traits.”); ROSARIO, infra note 54, at 6 
(“[T]he classification of homosexuality as abnormal or pathological does not exist in an essential way 
within its examination by scientists, but is constructed from a complex interaction of social values and 
individual researchers’ and subjects’ approaches, methods, and presuppositions.”); LEVAY, QUEER 
SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 171 (“On the one hand, this search [for a gay gene], if successful, seems to 
promise the most direct support for a liberating ‘born that way’ argument. On the other hand, it raises 
what is invariably described as the ‘specter of Nazi eugenics’—the possibility that attempts will be 
made to eliminate homosexuality through genetic ‘therapy,’ through the selective destruction of 
fetuses that carry ‘gay genes,’ or through sterilization of gay adults.”).  
 34. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 39–40. 
 35. Dean Hamer has stated that he plans to use the rights to exclude others from using the 
discovery in a way harmful to others. HAMER & COPELAND, SCIENCE OF DESIRE, supra note 16, at 219 
(“I could try to use the law to withhold the ‘testing’ technology, should it ever become available. 
Genetic testing as practiced in the United States requires commercialization, and commercialization 
generally requires protection of intellectual property through patents. If a lab does discover a ‘gay 
gene,’ it might be able to control the licensing of the technology.”); see also Garland E. Allen, The 
Double-Edged Sword of Genetic Determinism: Social and Political Agendas in Genetic Studies of 
Homosexuality, 1940–1994, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 242, 243 (Vernon A. Rosario ed., 
1997) (“[Hamer] also vowed to patent his genetic testing techniques to insure that they could not be 
used in a discriminatory way.”).  
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This Article will explore the potential for patents to perform a social 
signaling function, apart from the market signal articulated in portfolio 
theory. I contend that patents communicate information that is relevant not 
only in a technical or pecuniary sense but also in a normative one. Central 
to this signaling is the utility doctrine, which delineates the inventions that 
are socially beneficial and thus worthy of patent protection. I explore these 
contentions using the paradigm of sexual orientation because it is pregnant 
with issues of morality and the potential for expressive consequences. 
Granting patents on genes related to sexual orientation, and potentially 
other conditions such as deafness, high-functioning autism, or dwarfism, 
communicates government approval that these groups are pathological and 
should be cured. Such a communication expressively harms these groups. 
This line of argument contributes an additional basis to criticize granting 
certain patents in areas relating to human biology and genetics.36  
In Part II of this Article, I detail the biology of human sexual 
orientation, demonstrating that patents in this area are inevitable. Part III 
examines more rigorously the way in which a patent could signal 
condemnation of these various biologically-influenced groups. Part IV will 
then explore various prescriptions for dealing with this expressive harm.  
 
 
 36. See generally MARGARET DAVIES & NGAIRE NAFFINE, ARE PERSONS PROPERTY? LEGAL 
DEBATES ABOUT PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY 155–58 (2002) (“Indigenous people and third-world 
activists around the world have reacted strongly against sampling and patenting specifically directed at 
their regional genetic characteristics, arguing that it is an act of ‘bio-piracy’ and a violation of cultural 
self-determination.”); Bagley, supra note 12; Joshua C. Benson, Note, Resuscitating the Patent Utility 
Requirement, Again: A Return to Brenner v. Manson, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 267, 270 (2002); Donna 
M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the 
European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1623, 1667 (2001); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?: 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use? Law 
and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y R. 417, 423 (2003); Jordan 
Paradise, Lori Andrews & Timothy Holbrook, Patents on Human Genes: An Analysis of Scope and 
Claims, 307 SCI. 1566 (2005); Mark J. Hanson, Religious Voices in Biotechnology: The Case of Gene 
Patenting, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 1, 6 (1997). 
 These critiques differ from the one articulated in this Article. My argument is that, as a grant of 
property by the government, patents on inventions that relate to the identity of certain groups could 
inflict harm on those groups by suggesting they are less deserving or should be “cured.” The difference 
is subtle—previous criticisms, particularly based on identity, have condemned gene patents for 
affording property rights over what is quintessentially something that helps provide identity. My 
argument is that the government’s role, by granting patents, in fact suggests a preference for or against 
certain groups that are closely associated with that characteristic. My argument would apply not only 
to genes but also to other biological processes that help determine personality or non-pathological 
behaviors. In this Article, I do not argue that patenting of all genes, particularly those relating to 
diseases, is inappropriate.  
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II. THE BIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUALITY 
Homosexuality is undeniably in the moral margins of society. Although 
attitudes have shifted over the years, with ever-increasing acceptance in 
today’s society, a substantial portion of the U.S. population still views 
homosexuality as immoral, often due to religious beliefs.37 Approval or 
disapproval of homosexuality is tightly linked to a person’s age and to 
whether a person holds religious beliefs.38 Such views are not terribly 
surprising because as recently as 1973 homosexuality was viewed as 
psychologically pathological and worthy of treatment.39 The recent 
debates over the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, same-sex 
marriage, and gay adoption all highlight the reality that gays and lesbians 
are not on the same moral footing as heterosexuals in America today. 
Gays and lesbians have obtained greater acceptance socially and 
legally, however. Homosexuality is no longer considered a disease, and 
psychological treatments to change sexual orientation have been 
condemned by the medical establishment as ineffective and potentially 
harmful.40 Legally, states and localities are affording gays and lesbians far 
more legal protections than in the past.41 Many Americans believe that 
homosexuals should receive protection against employment 
discrimination.42 Many localities afford domestic partner benefits to same-
sex couples, and some states have begun to offer civil unions that afford 
rights equivalent to those of married couples.43 Massachusetts legalized 
 
 
 37. See Julian W. Slowinski, Therapeutic Dilemmas: Solving Sexual Difficulties in the Context of 
Religion, 26 J. OF SEX ED. & THERAPY 272, 278 (2001). A May 2006 Gallup poll found that forty-four 
percent of Americans say homosexuality is morally acceptable and fifty-one percent say it is morally 
wrong. Lydia Saad, Americans at Odds Over Gay Rights, GALLUP POLL, May 31, 2006, 
http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=23140.  
 38. Saad, supra note 37 (“However, across society such expressed tolerance ranges from 74% 
among liberal Americans to 18% among frequent churchgoers. A strong generational split is also 
evident, as only one-third (32%) of seniors say it is morally acceptable, compared with a majority 
(54%) of those under 40 years old.”).  
 39. ROBERT ALAN BROOKEY, REINVENTING THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL: THE RHETORIC AND 
POWER OF THE GAY GENE (2002). 
 40. Id. at 37; Hubert Kennedy, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs: First Theorist of Homosexuality, in 
SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 26, 39 (Vernon A. Rosario ed., 1997); LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, 
supra note 24, at 211. 
 41. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, Nos. A110449, A110450, A110451, A110463, A110651, 
A110652, slip op. at 15–16 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2006) (noting domestic partnership laws and legal 
protections). 
 42. Saad, supra note 37 (finding eighty-nine percent of Americans believe that homosexuals 
should have equal job opportunities).  
 43. Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 197 (1999). Connecticut began recognizing civil unions on 
October 1, 2005. See William Yardley, Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
21, 2005, at B5.  
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same-sex marriage itself.44 Even the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of gays 
and lesbians has shifted dramatically.45 The expressive dimension to these 
decisions is explicitly noted in the opinions.46  
Notwithstanding such progress, homosexuality in the United States 
remains a topic of considerable moral debate. Many religions condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral and view homosexuals as “disordered.”47 
Members of Congress have proposed a constitutional amendment to 
prohibit state and local governments from affording marriage rights to 
same-sex couples.48 A primary argument used by those opposed to gay 
rights is that homosexuality is a chosen lifestyle. In response to this 
argument, the gay rights movement has argued that homosexuality is not a 
choice.49 To bolster this argument, advocates suggest that—be it nature or 
nurture—there is no volition in deciding that one is gay or lesbian.  
Due in part to this debate, scientists have performed numerous 
investigations into the biological50 causes of homosexuality. Sexual 
orientation, even biologically speaking, is a complex characteristic; 
finding a single cause is highly unlikely.51 Sexual orientation is most 
 
 
 44. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 312 (2003). 
 45. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court held unconstitutional on equal protection 
grounds an amendment to the Colorado constitution that prohibited any arm of the state from 
extending legal protection to gays and lesbians. Id. at 635. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 
the Court held sodomy laws unconstitutional as a violation of due process, overruling Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In surprisingly strong language, the Court noted that “Bowers was not 
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 46. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“[Bower’s] continuance as precedent demeans the lives of 
homosexual persons.”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (The Colorado amendment “classifie[d] homosexuals 
not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”). 
 47. See generally ALICE OGDEN BELLIS & TERRY L. HUFFORD, SCIENCE, SCRIPTURE, AND 
HOMOSEXUALITY 13 (2002). See, e.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶¶ 2357–59 (2005), 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P85.HTM.  
 48. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay Marriage Ban Rejected, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2003, at 1; 
Evelyn Nieves, Family Values Groups Gear Up For Battle Over Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, Aug. 
17, 2003, at A6. 
 49. See Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERK. WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 109 n.205 
(2000). 
 50. When I refer to “biological” causes of homosexuality, I include both genetic, heritable causes 
and congenital causes, such as hormone levels in the uterus or relative placement of a fetus in the 
uterus. Such factors would be distinct from post-birth interactions with the environment, such as 
parental influence. One possible exception could be if, for example, something in a mother’s milk 
transferred hormones to the child, impacting the child’s sexual orientation. At this time, no such 
evidence exists but, because the impact would result from a physical exposure—hormone levels—I 
would also consider this to be biological even though it occurs after birth. 
 51. HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 198 (“We do not expect to find a gene that is 
the same in every gay man—we already know that sexual orientation is more complex than that—just 
one that is correlated to sexual orientation.”); Ronald Kotulak, Homosexuality May Be Issue of Brain 
Chemistry, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 2003, at 22 (“‘I don’t think homosexuality can easily be 
conceptualized as just one thing—a phenomenon that is due to one particular developmental 
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likely influenced by a number of biological factors.52 Overall, a person 
likely possesses a biologically determined disposition toward a certain 
sexual orientation, which is resistant to alteration.53  
This part reviews the studies exploring the biology of sexual 
orientation. These investigations confirm that sexual orientation is strongly 
influenced by biology, even if the particular mechanisms are presently 
unknown.54 Four categories of studies have demonstrated this influence: 
twin studies, brain physiology studies, gene marker studies, and fraternal 
birth-order studies.55  
A. Twin Studies Demonstrate Genetic Influence on Sexual Orientation 
The classic method for assessing the genetic influence on a trait is to 
study identical twins separated at birth. Because these siblings have an 
identical genetic makeup but do not share the same environment, such 
studies can isolate the impact of environmental influences on the 
expression of a given trait.56 For sexual orientation studies, however, such 
data are not readily available.57 Instead, the studies have focused on the 
differences between identical twins, fraternal twins, and siblings.58 If a 
trait is genetically linked, then identical twins will more likely share the 
trait, whereas fraternal twins will possess the trait at the same ratio as a 
non-twin sibling.59 If the trait is influenced by intrauterine factors, then 
 
 
pathway.’” (quoting Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, a Columbia University professor of clinical 
psychology)). 
 52. Mustanski, supra note 31, at 273 (“Given the complexity of sexual orientation, numerous 
genes are likely to be involved . . . .”); Pillard, supra note 23, at 230. 
 53. Pillard, supra note 23, at 233. 
 54. I use “environmental” to refer to non-biological influences. This is in contrast to a geneticist, 
who would view, for example, variations in intrauterine conditions as “environmental.” See Vernon A. 
Rosario, Homosexual Bio-Histories: Genetic Nostalgias and the Quest for Paternity, in SCIENCE AND 
HOMOSEXUALITIES 1, 4 (Vernon A. Rosario ed., 1997). Thus, I eschew the geneticist definition, 
focusing on potential biological sources of homosexuality. See supra note 50. 
 55. These studies exclusively deal with gay men and not with lesbians. Little is known about the 
origins of lesbianism. See, e.g., Edward M. Miller, Homosexuality, Birth Order, and Evolution: 
Toward an Equilibrium Reproductive Economics of Homosexuality, 29 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 
1, 14 (2000); Domonick J. Wegesin, A Neuropsychologic Profile of Homosexual and Heterosexual 
Men and Women, 27 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 91, 92 (1998).  
 56. See BELLIS & HUFFORD, supra note 47, at 29; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 
177. 
 57. Gay identical twins that have been reared separately have been studied, but the numbers are 
too small to have any statistical significance. Id. at 178. 
 58. BELLIS & HUFFORD, supra note 47, at 25–30. 
 59. Pillard, supra note 23, at 234. Adoptive siblings will share the trait at same rate as the 
population as a whole. Id. 
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fraternal twins will share the trait more frequently than non-twin 
siblings.60 
Numerous twin studies have been performed with respect to 
homosexuality.61 The study performed by J. Michael Bailey and Richard 
Pillard found that in fifty-two percent of the cases, if one identical twin 
was gay, then the other also was.62 The rate for fraternal twin brothers was 
twenty-two percent.63 The concordance rate for adopted brothers was only 
eleven percent.64 Thus, while not entirely determined by genetics,65 
homosexuality does have a strong genetic component. Numerous other 
twin studies have been performed that confirm a genetic influence.66 
Therefore, “[t]here is no room for doubt that homosexuality is highly 
heritable.”67 
B. Variations in the Hypothalamus Suggest There May Be a Biologically 
“Gay Brain” 
In addition to twin studies, researchers have explored whether there 
could be physical differences between gays and straights that might 
suggest a biological origin to sexual orientation. A natural place to look 
for such physiological differences would be the brain given that sexual 
attraction and arousal are strongly rooted there. Of particular importance is 
the hypothalamus, the part of the brain from which sexual desire 
 
 
 60. Id. at 234. 
 61. See LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 173–78; MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 117 (1999) (“A dozen other studies came to a similar 
conclusion [that a gene or genes contribute to homosexuality].”).  
 62. J. Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48 
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1092 (1991).  
 63. Id. 
 64. Allen, supra note 35, at 252. 
 65. An exclusively genetic trait would have a concordance rate of one hundred percent. BELLIS & 
HUFFORD, supra note 47, at 26. A concordance rate of less than one hundred percent does not mean 
there is no genetic component to homosexuality or that homosexuality arises strictly due to 
environmental forces. See William J. Turner, Homosexuality, Type 1: An Xq28 Phenomenon, 24 
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 109, 125–26 (1995). For other anatomical and biochemical conditions, 
concordance rates can be less than one hundred percent due to other biological mechanisms coming 
into play. HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 188; Turner, supra, at 125–26. The gay 
gene may simply be inactive in the unaffected sibling. Turner, supra, at 126. 
 66. See BELLIS & HUFFORD, supra note 47, at 27–28; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 
175–77; Mustanski, supra note 31, at 273 (all summarizing various twin studies). 
 67. RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 116–17; see also LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 177. 
Indeed, studies suggest that shared parental environment has almost no impact on sexual orientation. 
HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 188 (“In the most careful twin study to date, the best 
mathematical estimate for the shared environmental component of variance was 0 percent.”). 
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originates.68 Researcher Simon LeVay discovered that the size of the 
hypothalamus differs between homosexual and heterosexual men.69 Prior 
research showed that the hypothalami of men and women differ in size in 
a statistically significant way.70 In LeVay’s study, he found that, on 
average, gay men’s hypothalamus were two to three times smaller than 
heterosexual men’s and were the same size as women’s.71 Such a finding 
suggests that the neuronal mechanisms in the brain that regulate sexual 
behavior may differ physically between gay and straight men.72 Finding 
physical differences in the brains of gay men is consistent with studies on 
cognitive differences between gays and straights, which suggest differing 
brain structures,73 and with studies done on animals demonstrating same-
sex attraction, which show a similar dimorphism in the hypothalamus.74 
Subsequent studies also have shown variations in the brain structures of 
gays and straights.75 These differences in brain structure could be the 
result of genetic or hormonal influence on the development of the brain. 
There is a “chicken-and-egg” problem to these studies, however. The 
brain is a dynamic organ that changes over time. As such, environmental 
factors—such as engaging in different sexual behaviors—could change the 
shape of the hypothalamus or program it to react to certain stimuli.76 As 
 
 
 68. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 89 
(2002). 
 69. SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN 120 (1993) [hereinafter LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN]. 
 70. LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 69, at 120. The hypothalamus is “a tiny region at the 
base of the brain.” LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 130. LeVay specifically studied the 
INAH 3 region, which is sexually dimorphic. LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 69, at 120. For 
convenience, I will refer generally to the hypothalamus.  
 71. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 143; LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 69, at 
120–21. 
 72. LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 69, at 121. LeVay considered alternative possible causes 
for the size difference, such as whether AIDS had changed the size of the hypothalamuses of the gay 
men. He concludes that AIDS was not the cause of the difference, but recognizes that using AIDS 
victims risks a sampling bias. Id. 
 73. Wegesin, supra note 55, at 94. 
 74. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 199. Homosexual acts have been observed in a 
variety of animals. Id. at 197; see also Larry Thompson, Search for a Gay Gene, TIME, June 12, 1995, 
at 60–61 (homosexuality in fruit flies). Homosexual conduct is “widely distributed in the animal 
kingdom.” PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES 195 (2000). Hypothalamus differences have been 
found in rams as well. Ronald Kotulak, Homosexuality May Be Issue of Brain Chemistry, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 13, 2003, at 22. 
 75. Miller, supra note 55, at 13. In a study of the reaction of men to male-derived chemicals, the 
homosexual men in the study responded in the same manner as straight women, with activation of the 
hypothalamus, whereas heterosexual men showed no response. See Ivanka Savic et al., Brain Response 
to Putative Pheromones in Homosexual Men, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 7356, 7356 (2005). 
 76. See, e.g., BELLIS & HUFFORD, supra note 47, at 36; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, 
at 144 (“[T]here is always at least the theoretical possibility that the structural differences are actually 
the result of differences in sexual behavior.”).  
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such, these results beg the question of whether the brain differences 
influenced sexual orientation or whether sexual orientation influenced the 
changes in the brain.77 Regardless, there is considerable scientific evidence 
that the physical structure of the brain plays a significant role in sexual 
orientation.  
C. Discovery of a “Gay Gene” Marker Suggests a Genetic Link to 
Homosexuality 
One possible reason for the physical differences between gay and 
straight brains is that a gene or genes could influence the development of 
the brain. If there is such a genetic link, then homosexuality should run in 
families.78 In fact, it does—both gay men and lesbians have a greater 
likelihood of having gay or lesbian siblings.79 Researcher Dean Hamer 
recognized this reality, resulting in perhaps the most startling—and 
controversial—scientific study into the biological cause of homosexuality: 
he identified a link between a known genetic marker on the X 
chromosome and homosexuality, suggesting a gene influencing sexual 
orientation may be at that location. 
Hamer had noted that the maternal branches of his subjects contained a 
disproportionate number of homosexual family members.80 If a 
characteristic seems to be passed to a son by the mother and not the father, 
then it likely is controlled by a gene on the X chromosome.81 Recognizing 
the likelihood that homosexuality could be a sex-linked trait, Hamer 
performed a linkage study on his subjects82 and found a statistically 
 
 
 77. See LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 69, at 122; Rosario, supra note 54, at 5 (“[A] larger 
INAH 3 might be either one of the causes of male heterosexuality, or the by-product of a heterosexual 
lifestyle choice.”); Savic et al., supra note 75, at 7361 (noting causation of hormone response could be 
hypothalamus differentiation, acquired sensitization through stimuli, or association with scent to sex). 
 78. Pillard, supra note 23, at 233. 
 79. Id.; Sven Bocklandt et al., Extreme Skewing of X Chromosome Inactivation in Mothers of 
Homosexual Men, 118 HUM. GENETICS 691, 691 (2006); Mustanski, supra note 31, at 273. 
 80. HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 190; HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra 
note 16, at 93–94. 
 81. HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 15, at 95. 
 82. HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 16, at 120–33. A linkage study does not identify a 
gene for a given trait but instead shows a statistical relationship between a stretch of DNA and a trait. 
Pillard, supra note 23, at 235. Specifically, such studies examine the statistical probability that there is 
a gene associated with a phenotypic trait on a chromosome at a known location, the marker. The 
linkage is demonstrated through the use of markers, which are genes or gene fragments that are known 
on a given chromosome. These markers act as road signs because, on a single chromosome, genes 
close together generally stay together during meiotic cell division. So, if there is a gay gene on the X 
chromosome, it will almost always be beside a given marker. The linkage study examined whether the 
gay members of a family share a marker that the straight members did not. If such a correlation exists, 
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significant link between a known marker, Xq28, and the trait of male 
homosexuality.83 The study concluded that the “linkage results [were] 
statistically significant at a confidence level of >99 percent.”84  
Although some have disputed this linkage,85 Hamer subsequently 
confirmed his results.86 Other studies have also suggested a genetic 
influence arising from the X chromosome.87 More recent investigations 
have expanded the search for genes influencing orientation beyond the X 
chromosome and have identified three new regions where potential “gay 
genes” may be located.88 Thus, researchers are likely to find genes that 
influence sexual orientation, discoveries that would be eligible for patent 
protection. Minimally, the quest continues in earnest.  
D. Male Birth Order Phenomenon Suggests a Congenital Origin 
Genes may not be the only biological trigger for homosexuality. Recent 
studies have also demonstrated a potential congenital cause for male 
homosexuality. The more sons that a woman has, the greater the likelihood 
that a subsequent son will be gay.89 So, younger brothers are more likely 
 
 
then the trait—homosexuality—may have a genetic component located near that marker. See generally 
HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 16, at 113. 
 83. HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 16, at 121–33. By chance, brothers would 
normally have a 50% chance of sharing the markers; Hamer found that 83% of the gay brothers had 
matching variants, while the control of random pairs of brothers satisfied the expected 50% rate. Allen, 
supra note 35, at 253. 
 84. Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male 
Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321, 325 (1993), reprinted in HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra 
note 16, at App. A. Importantly, the study did not find a gay gene. It merely found an association 
between homosexuality and a location on the X chromosome. 
 85. A group of researchers at the University of Western Ontario failed to find any markers linked 
to homosexuality. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 184–85. Importantly, these results were 
not published in a peer-reviewed journal. Mustanski, supra note 31, at 273. Moreover, the 
methodology of that study renders its findings ambiguous as to the impact of Xq28 on homosexuality 
because the study looked at paternal relatives, not maternal. HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 
15, at 197.  
 86. BELLIS & HUFFORD, supra note 47, at 25; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 183–
84; Mustanski, supra note 31, at 273. 
 87. Turner, supra note 65, at 121, 125. A recent study found that mothers of gay men tend to 
have more offspring. This study provides further support for a genetic predisposition for 
homosexuality and also offers a theory to resolve the Darwinian paradox—that a gene for 
homosexuality should die out because it does not encourage propagation of the gene. Andrea 
Camperio-Ciani et al., Evidence for Maternally Inherited Factors Favouring Male Homosexuality and 
Promoting Female Fecundity, PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2217, 2219, (2004); 
see also Andy Coughlin, Survival of Genetic Homosexual Traits Explained (Oct. 13, 2004), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn6519 (“‘The same factor that influences sexual 
orientation in males promotes higher fecundity in females.’”) (quoting Andrea Camperio-Ciani). 
 88. Mustanski, supra note 31, at 276. 
 89. See RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 118 (“A man with one or more elder brothers is more likely to 
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to be gay than their older brothers. Interestingly, the presence of sisters is 
irrelevant, resulting in a fraternal birth order effect.90 While anecdotally, 
many gay men have noted that they and many of their friends are the 
youngest in the family, the studies show that there is more to this 
phenomenon than simple coincidence. Each additional older brother 
increases the likelihood of homosexuality by about one-third,91 and the 
phenomenon has been documented not only in the United States but also 
in Britain, the Netherlands, and Canada.92 Moreover, a recent study has 
shown that the birth effect is not due to any social factors related to 
exposure to older siblings. The only significant factor was the number of 
older biological male siblings, regardless of whether the gay individual 
was raised with those brothers.93 
Scientists have yet to discover the exact process that creates the birth-
order effect, although they have posited various theories. Hormone levels, 
or the fetuses’ susceptibility to hormones, could influence sexual 
orientation.94 A woman could build up a “resistance” to the male fetus, 
creating more female hormones.95 These hormones may interfere with the 
determination of the cells and brain structures that otherwise result in a 
heterosexual child.96 If the hormones act to prevent masculinization of the 
developing fetus—or allow feminization—the result could be changes in 
the sexual differentiation of the brain.97 Finally, there could be a genetic 
 
 
be gay than a man with no siblings, only younger siblings, or with one or more elder sisters.”); Ray 
Blanchard & Anthony F. Bogaert, Birth Order in Homosexual Versus Heterosexual Sex Offenders 
Against Children, Pubescents, and Adults, 27 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 595, 595–96 (1998); 
David W. Purcell et al., Birth Order in a Contemporary Sample of Gay Men, 29 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 349, 352–53 (2000). 
 90. RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 118; Purcell, supra note 89, at 350. 
 91. RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 118. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Anthony F. Bogaert, Biological Versus Nonbiological Older Brothers and Men’s Sexual 
Orientation, 103 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 10771, 10771 (2006). The study found that 
“[o]nly biological older brothers [reared with or not] and not any other sibling characteristic, including 
nonbiological older brothers, [and the time reared with older biological or older nonbiological 
brothers] predicted men’s sexual orientation.” Id. at 10771.  
 94. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 37. 
 95. Blanchard and Bogaert, supra note 89, at 602 (suggesting the fraternal birth order 
phenomenon “reflects the progressive immunization of some mothers to Y-linked minor 
histocompatibility antigens (H-Y antigen) by each succeeding male fetus, and the concomitantly 
increasing effects of H-Y antibodies on the sexual differentiation of the brain in each succeeding male 
fetus.”); Bogaert, supra note 93, at 10772–73; Purcell et al., supra note 89, at 354.  
 96. Blanchard & Bogaert, supra note 89, at 602. Ridley notes that the H-Y gene is similar to a 
gene that encodes the anti-Mullerian hormone, responsible for causing the regression of the Mullerian 
ducts in a male embryo. RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 119. These ducts are the precursors to the uterus 
and Fallopian tubes and, thus, their regression is essential for the development of a male embryo. 
RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 119. 
 97. RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 119 (“If so, the effect of a strong immune reaction against these 
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component because genes could influence how the fetus interacts with the 
intrauterine hormones.98  
All of these biological investigations demonstrate that sexual 
orientation is influenced by biological mechanisms. While homosexuality 
may not be entirely determined by biology, any aspect of biology that is 
relevant could serve as a means to moderate the process. These techniques, 
or even simple correlations of hormone levels or the presence of certain 
genes with an increased likelihood of a homosexual orientation would be 
eligible for patent protection. Patents on these discoveries therefore are 
highly likely, if not inevitable, particularly in this era where there is an 
apparent rush to patent everything.  
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPRESSIVE HARMS FROM PATENTS 
The patent system will confront these types of biological discoveries. 
Patent applicants can claim their invention in a variety of ways under the 
patent laws. Patents are available for methods, machines, manufactures, 
and compositions of matter.99 Applicants therefore could claim discoveries 
and innovations relating to sexual orientation, and other biologically 
defined traits, in one of these forms. For example, if an actual gene that 
influences sexual orientation is discovered, the scientist could obtain a 
patent that claims the purified and isolated gene as a composition of 
matter. If variations of in utero hormone levels are found to influence 
orientation, then the applicant could patent a method of measuring those 
hormone levels and correlating those levels with the likelihood of the fetus 
being gay. The ultimate claim would be a method of altering these various 
biological pathways in the hope of altering the subject’s sexual orientation, 
particularly if acting in utero. The patent system is thus directly implicated 
 
 
proteins from the mother would be partly to prevent the masculinisation of the brain, but not that of the 
genitals.”); LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 69, at 123; Blanchard & Bogaert, supra note 89, at 
602.  
 98. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 125; Miller, supra note 55, at 6 (“Such genes 
might change the level of hormones during prenatal critical periods, or the receptor density, or the 
level of enzymes that convert one steroid to another, or the level of binding proteins, or the 
permeability of the blood-brain barrier to hormones . . . . Just enumerating some of the possible 
pathways makes it plausible that multiple genes could be involved.”). Miller suggests that the birth 
order effect would have reproductive advantages because later-born, more feminized sons would 
“reduce[] the probability of these sons engaging in unproductive competition with each other.” Miller, 
supra note 55, at 30. The recent study on the fecundity of mothers also supports these various 
hypotheses. In order for the birth order phenomenon to take place, a given female must have a fair 
number of off-spring. The link between male homosexuality and increased female fecundity further 
supports the “immunization view.” Camperio-Ciani et al., supra note 87, at 2219. 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
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in these technologies and is fostering an incentive to create eugenic 
technologies that will be in the hands of private parties.  
A. What Are Expressive Harms? 
Expressive theories of law are concerned with the way in which 
government action can communicate a specific belief or attitude of the 
state, such as hostility to racial or ethnic groups or religion.100 Under this 
view, laws can shape or reinforce social norms and also inflict harms upon 
members of society.101 Indeed, it is beyond cavil that “the linguistic 
meaning of governmental action can have a moral impact.”102 Laws can be 
examined normatively by assessing how they express certain intentions 
and attitudes.103 Racial segregation, for example, communicates that 
blacks are inferior to whites and that whites must be protected from 
blacks.104 The expressive harm occurs regardless of whether the targets—
here blacks—believe or accept the message; so long as they understand the 
message communicated, the harm arises.105 What is important is the 
“social, or symbolic, meaning” of certain laws or other acts by the state.106 
Specifically, “[e]xpressive theories do not somehow tell us to 
maximize the amount of proper expression in the world. Instead, 
expressive theories are regulative theories that provide principled 
constraints on how we go about pursuing various ends.”107 The subjective 
 
 
 100. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2000) [hereinafter Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I]. 
 101. Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 
670 (2003). 
 102. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1363, 1494 (2000). Within the academic literature, there has been a debate over what constitutes 
“expressivism” and whether such a theory can justify certain laws. Compare id. at 1364 with Anderson 
& Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100. Both of these camps, however, recognize that government acts 
can have expressive impacts. See Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic “Expression,” 
and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1577, 1577 (2000). I am not suggesting that patent law is justified by expressive theory. Instead, I 
am exploring the proposition that both sides agree could occur: the grant of a patent—a form of 
government communication—can express disfavor or hostility towards certain members of society. 
 103. Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1508; Rosen, supra note 101, at 669–70.  
 104. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005) (“Racial classifications raise 
special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose. Thus, we have admonished time and 
again that, ‘[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there 
is simply no way of determining . . . what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions 
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.” (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
493 (1989) (plurality opinion))); see also Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1528. 
 105. Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1528. 
 106. Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 40–41 
(2002). 
 107. Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1512. 
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intent of a speaker is not necessarily sufficient to explain the message 
communicated, however. Whether an expressive harm arises under these 
theories is objectively assessed from the viewpoint of the public.108 Thus, 
somewhat surprisingly, the intentions of an actor are not the only factors 
relevant in assessing the expressive impact of those acts.109 The expressive 
harm can arise when people understand the message communicated, even 
if they may not agree with the message.110 Any interpretation of the impact 
of course will depend on the context of the communication.111 A person 
will suffer an expressive harm when “she is treated according to principles 
that communicate negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her.”112 Under 
expressive theories, “state action should be wrong . . . when it expresses 
impermissible valuations, without regard to further concerns about its 
cultural or material consequences.”113  
The acts of the state can thus send a signal about what the norms of a 
society ought to be.114 Laws can impact the views of individuals about 
which behaviors are approved or disapproved by society as a whole,115 
resulting in an actor understanding how others will view her behavior.116 
The state can act as a collective to express certain views, even if those 
views differ from those of individual legislators.117 The legislative process 
also can affect attitudes expressively by revealing new information to 
society regarding a given subject.118 Indeed, there may not even have to be 
a law passed—simple disclosure by the government may have expressive 
impacts.119 
Expressive theory is present in a number of legal areas. Equal 
protection jurisprudence is rife with concerns of government 
stigmatization or marginalization of people based on characteristics such 
as race, ethnicity, and gender.120 The courts have found laws 
 
 
 108. Id. at 1512. 
 109. Id. at 1513. 
 110. Id. at 1545. 
 111. Id. at 1525.  
 112. Id. at 1528. 
 113. Id. at 1531. 
 114. See Geisinger, supra note 106, at 43; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029–44 (1996). 
 115. See Geisinger, supra note 106, at 45. 
 116. Id. at 47.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 64–65. 
 119. Id. at 67. Geisinger uses the example of the Surgeon General announcing the harm from 
second-hand smoke. Id. While not a statute, it is a communication of information from an arm of the 
state. Thus, the government can send signals even absent the passage of an actual statute. 
 120. Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1533. 
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unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause even absent any actual, 
non-psychic harm: the expression of these views alone is sufficient.121 
Similar outcomes are found in the Establishment Clause cases, where the 
courts have found state acts as unconstitutionally endorsing religion; such 
endorsement is viewed as impermissible due to the fear of excluding 
members of society who do not adhere to the particular religious views 
expressed or embraced.122 Criminal punishment, particularly incarceration, 
has received support from expressive theories, which suggest that a fine or 
community service in lieu of prison terms does not sufficiently 
communicate the moral condemnation to society that a loss of liberty 
through imprisonment can.123 
Gays and lesbians have long endured laws which inflict expressive 
harms against them.124 Sodomy laws were used to classify homosexuals as 
“criminals,” even if the laws were never enforced.125 Until overturned by 
the Supreme Court, Colorado’s amendment to the state constitution that 
prohibited cities and municipalities from providing civil rights protection 
for gays and lesbians communicated a strong message of inferiority.126 
 
 
 121. Id. at 1534–35; see Johnson, 543 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Such musings inspire 
little confidence. Indeed, this comment supports the suspicion that the policy is based on racial 
stereotypes and outmoded fears about the dangers of racial integration. This Court should give no 
credence to such cynical, reflexive conclusions about race.”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) 
(“Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race ‘are by their very nature odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ They threaten to stigmatize individuals 
by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1973))). 
 122. Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1547. Whether those “nonadherents” 
actually feel excluded is irrelevant. Id. What is key is the government’s communication of 
endorsement which necessarily excludes those nonadherents. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite 
message.”). Justice O’Connor’s views have begun to take hold in the Court’s establishment 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
593–94 (1989) (citing O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch favorably).  
 123. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 605–30 
(1996). But see Adler, supra note 102, at 1366–68 (discussing and criticizing this theory).  
 124. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 
146–76 (1996).  
 125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”); see also Christopher R. Leslie, 
Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 103, 104 (2000). Leslie correctly points out that sodomy laws harmed gays and lesbians beyond 
expressive harms, such as providing a basis to deny child custody to gay and lesbian parents and denial 
of certain employment opportunities. Id. 
 126. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”).  
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The denial of the right to marry also inflicts expressive harms—by being 
denied rights equal with those of heterosexuals, homosexuals are relegated 
to second-class citizenship.127 
Recent patent scholarship has shown that patents communicate 
information beyond technical information regarding the invention.128 This 
part similarly explores the ability of patents to communicate messages and 
signals, but of a non-pecuniary nature. The grant of a patent could 
communicate government disdain towards various biologically defined 
groups and behaviors by stating that “curing” these people is normatively 
good. Indeed, the patent system can be seen as facilitating privatized 
eugenics, a status of moral ambiguity. Now is the time to consider the 
possible implications of these inevitable discoveries.129  
B. Factors that Influence the Expressive Aspect of Patenting 
No one has explored what expressive impact, if any, a patent could 
have. Currently, the patent system is viewed as morally agnostic, making 
no judgments about the value of individual patents. This perspective may 
need reconsideration in light of the biotechnology revolution. As 
researchers discover genes that relate to behaviors, and not diseases, our 
traditional understanding of the patent system will be tested. The relevant 
biological processes will continue to be a focus of scientific 
investigation,130 and discoveries in this area certainly will be the subject of 
 
 
 127. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1207 (2004) (“The dissimilitude 
between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; it is a considered choice of 
language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-
class status.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 312 (2003) (“The question before 
us is whether . . . the Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by 
civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. The 
Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It forbids the creation of 
second-class citizens.”); see also Bonnie Miller Rubin, Same-sex Couples See Some Light, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 19, 2003, at 30 (“‘Every day, you face reminders that you’re a second-class citizen.’”). Cf. 
Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1533–45 (discussing expressivism in the context 
of equal protection jurisprudence, noting that the creation of “second-class citizenship” is one of the 
“most conventional expressive concerns”).  
 128. See Heald, supra note 8, at 476; Long, supra note 7, at 636–37; Parchomovsky & Wagner, 
supra note 7, at 7–9.  
 129. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 19 (“Technological prediction is notoriously difficult and 
risky, particularly when talking about events that may still lie a generation or two away. Nonetheless, 
it is important to lay out some scenarios for possible futures that suggest a range of outcomes, some of 
which are very likely and even emerging today, and others which may never in the end materialize.”).  
 130. HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 301 (“The combination of these two 
forces—the stampede to map the genome plus the decisive role of genes in behavior—means that, 
whether anyone thinks it’s a good idea or not, we soon will have the ability to change and manipulate 
human behavior through genetics.”). 
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future patent applications. For groups such as gays, the deaf,131 dwarfs,132 
and high-functioning autistics, the granting of a patent risks 
communicating that they are inferior, flawed members of society that 
should be cured133 or, potentially through prenatal testing or gene therapy, 
eliminated altogether.134 I will use homosexuality as the paradigm to 
explore this expressive potential. The use of patents in the context of 
sexual orientation research is nearly a foregone conclusion. Dean Hamer 
has already stated that, if he isolates a gay gene, he intends to obtain 
intellectual property rights on it.135 
Investigation of factors relative to expressive harms has never been 
discussed. For legislation, the communication of the message was 
presumed: it was simply not relevant whether the general populace was 
aware of a law being on the books. Statutes are public in nature and thus 
tend to “‘stand out’ against the background of public discourse.”136 The 
nature of law as a governmental act necessarily communicates something 
 
 
 131. Comparisons between the experience of gays and the deaf have been made previously. See 
Rosario, supra note 54, at 11 (“Analogous to the case of deaf children struggling to consolidate an 
identity in a hearing family, most gays and lesbians lack familial role models for developing a 
‘homosexual identity’ if they grow up in a heterosexual household.”). Richard Pillard poignantly 
explains the comparison: 
I suppose most parents would not choose to have a gay child if they could choose otherwise. 
Fortunately, that choice is not at hand, but similar choices are. Deafness will soon be an 
example. Deafness is frequently genetic; approximately thirty different genetic loci for 
deafness have been hypothesized. Many people see deafness simply as a “handicap” and 
could not imagine the slightest objection to reducing or eliminating it. But those born deaf 
have a linguistic and cultural community, as precious to them as the gay community is to 
gays. The deaf, not surprisingly, want control of their culture and resent the imperialistic 
assumptions of the hearing majority. 
Pillard, supra note 23, at 238. 
 132. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 209 (“Something similar [to homosexuality] can be said of 
dwarfism: human heights are distributed normally, and it is not clear at what point in the distribution 
one becomes a dwarf.”). 
 133. See id. at 39 (“Scientific knowledge about causation will inevitably lead to a technological 
search for ways to manipulate that causality.”). 
 134. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 9 (“[W]ill we develop the technology to engineer 
homosexuality out of the human race, for example, and if so, should we be taking steps to prevent this 
from happening?”). 
 135. Hamer states that he plans to use the rights to exclude others from using the discovery in a 
way harmful to others. HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 16, at 219 (“Third, I could try to use 
the law to withhold the ‘testing’ technology, should it ever become available. Genetic testing as 
practiced in the United States requires commercialization, and commercialization generally requires 
protection of intellectual property through patents. If a lab does discover a ‘gay gene,’ it might be able 
to control the licensing of the technology.”); see also Allen, supra note 35, at 243. Of course a patent 
right is only temporary—at the end of the term, anyone is free to use the invention. So, Hamer’s 
laudable objective could only be temporarily realized.  
 136. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1668 
(2000). 
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to the public. The content of every law, of course, is not expressed to the 
public, but laws can permeate the public sphere in a variety of ways—
advertisement by the state, particular controversies surrounding a new law 
that are reported in the media,137 and the potential for sanctions against 
third parties.138 Laws or governmental communications, particularly those 
that impact people directly, are more likely to have an expressive impact. 
Such an assumption may not be valid in the patent context, however.  
This part will identify a variety of factors that influence the expressive 
potential of patents. The first two of these factors are relevant to the 
threshold issue of whether patents can send expressive signals at all. The 
remaining factors concern the strength of such a signal and address the 
issue of whether any such signal may be lost in other “noise.”  
1. The Grant of a Patent as a Governmental Act: Are Patents Akin to 
Statutes? 
Generally, expressive theory has focused on statutes passed by 
governments, such as sodomy laws or laws that discriminate on the basis 
of race, gender, or other categories.139 Commentators have also noted that 
expressive communications can occur through regulatory agencies and 
even judges.140 Others have suggested that mere government 
communications that fall short of a statute can serve a signaling 
function.141 What is key is a government communication—via statute or 
other information—that transmits the expressive message to the public. 
The question thus arises: is the grant of a patent akin to a statute or other 
form of government communication? 
Patents serve purposes beyond simply affording the inventors exclusive 
rights to their inventions. They also serve to notify the public as to the 
scope of those rights, as well as providing disclosure to the public so that 
the know-how underlying the invention will enter the public domain. 
Patents can also serve as economic signals to other entities about the 
innovative ability and strength of a company142 and to reduce transaction 
costs between parties.143 These roles for patents demonstrate that patents 
 
 
 137. Patents in the biotech world have garnered media attention already. See infra note 157 and 
accompanying text. 
 138. McAdams, supra note 136, at 1668–69. 
 139. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 100, at 1533–64. 
 140. McAdams, supra note 136, at 1678–89. 
 141. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 142. See generally Long, supra note 7; Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 7. 
 143. See generally Heald, supra note 8.  
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have a broader role in the public than the basic disclosure obligations 
suggest. The main reason patents can serve such varied functions is 
because they are grants of exclusive rights from the federal government. 
The patent has gone through a review by the government that vests the 
patent with some level of certainty regarding the credibility of the 
disclosure. The government also ensures that the patent will have some 
bite—it is a right enforceable against the world at large. While not 
technically legislation, the patent grant can be viewed as akin to private 
legislation.144 
Courts have compared patents to statutes previously, recognizing that 
they share common features: “There can be only one correct interpretation 
of a statute that applies to all persons. Statutes are written instruments that 
all persons are presumed to be aware of and are bound to follow. Statutes, 
like patents, are enforceable against the public, unlike private agreements 
between contracting parties.”145 Thus, while a patent is granted by an 
agency and is not enacted by Congress, patents and statutes do share 
several similarities, particularly the function of establishing rights of 
which the public is presumptively aware. These rights derive directly from 
the federal government through the substantive review and grant afforded 
by the PTO. 
Members of the public look to patents as a signal of something beyond 
mere technical information, such as a signal of the firm’s innovativeness. 
There is no reason why patents cannot communicate other, non-
commercial messages. Previous experience demonstrates that, like 
statutes, patents can communicate signals of morality. Controversies over 
biotechnology patents confirm that the public does make the link between 
a patent and potential moral signaling from the federal government.146 The 
public looks at what is being granted because the government is giving its 
imprimatur on the disclosed invention.147 The patent system is in essence 
an incentive system by the government to encourage innovation that in 
 
 
 144. John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569, 582 (2002) 
(“Patents may be conceived as a sort of private legislation.”).  
 145. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 146. See Bagley, supra 12, at 473 (“The patent [on cloning products] and news reports of other 
human cloning activity drew critical reaction, commentary, and calls for legislative action from a 
variety of sources.”). 
 147. Id. at 475–76 (acknowledging that, while banning patents on morally controversial subject 
matter will not halt research in those areas, “[t]he availability of a government imprimatur granting 
exclusive rights over morally controversial inventions is especially problematic in the area of 
biotechnology because no one should ‘own’ and the government should not encourage certain 
inventions”).  
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some circumstances may be of morally questionable subject matter.148 The 
grant of the patent informs the public that the government has deemed the 
disclosed invention as worthy of the governmentally granted right to 
exclude.  
Patents undisputedly can serve as the government’s “stamp of 
approval.” Patents can “legitim[ize] novel technologies and the theories 
they apply.”149 They can “validate inventions” of questionable scientific 
credibility.150 The same impact could be had on morally questionable 
inventions: the patent validates these inventions as legitimate, ethical 
science. Because the patent is awarded by the government after careful 
review, it communicates that this morally questionable subject matter has 
legitimacy.  
The salience of this position is clearer if patents are considered as a 
form of government subsidy.151 Few would deny that the federal 
government has the ability (and perhaps the obligation) to deny direct 
funding to morally objectionable research. We do not want our tax money 
going into research that is offensive. A patent is effectively indirect federal 
funding: the government’s grant of the patent requires the public to pay for 
the invention due to the exclusive rights afforded under the patent. 
Therefore, denying patent protection (while paradoxically allowing the use 
of the invention to be even more widespread152) does seem reasonable. 
The same would be the case if the government simply was distributing 
research grants: denial of funds would not stop research into the 
technological area, but likely would slow such research while also 
expressing government concerns with the technology. The recent denials 
of federal funding on stem cell research exemplify the reality that 
government subsidies are laced with moral considerations.153  
 
 
 148. Id. at 476. 
 149. Lee, supra note 12, at 676.  
 150. Id. 
 151. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1032 (2005) (arguing that patents should be viewed as government subsidy). Whether 
intellectual property should be considered as “property” as opposed to a form of government subsidy is 
the subject of considerable debate. See generally id. at 1033–46 (discussing the rise of the view of 
intellectual property as a form of property).  
 152. If patent protection is denied, then no one has the right to exclude others from practicing the 
invention. Unless held as a trade secret, the technology becomes free for others to practice. Even if the 
invention is held as a trade secret, independent discovery would permit third parties to use the 
technology free of liability. Denial of patent protection, however, lessens the incentive to engage in 
such research, so there might be some slowing of development in a morally questionable area, just as 
denial of federal funds would slow, although not stop, research into certain areas. The recent stem cell 
controversies are exemplary of this dynamic.  
 153. See Christopher Robertson, Recent Developments in the Law and Ethics of Embryonic 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/2
p573 Holbrook book pages.doc4/30/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE EXPRESSIVE IMPACT OF PATENTS 599 
 
 
 
 
The mere grant of a patent—independent of the whether the technology 
develops—implicates moral concerns. Passed in an appropriations bill in 
2004, the Weldon Amendment precludes the PTO from using any of its 
funds to issue a patent with “claims directed to or encompassing a human 
organism.”154 Congressman Dave Weldon was concerned with the 
commodification of humanity, where “technology can be used to 
undermine what is meant to be human, including the exploitation of 
human nature for the purpose of financial gain.”155 Weldon noted that 
“[j]ust because something can be done does not mean that it should be 
done . . . We should not allow such researchers to gain financially by 
granting them an exclusive right to practice such ghoulish research.”156 
Significantly, and paradoxically to some, denying patents, or precluding 
their issuance due to funding limitations, will not stop the creation of such 
technology. Patent denial means that anyone who develops the technology 
will be free to use it, absent regulatory or legal restraints on such 
technologies that arise outside of the patent laws. The ban does remove the 
government-provided incentive to develop such technologies. Fears of and 
objections to patenting humans, therefore, must be rooted in something 
broader—the idea that patents can express government endorsement of 
morally objectionable technologies.157 
Similar concerns with the ability of patents to communicate a message 
of moral endorsement of technologies by governments is apparent in 
international patent treaties. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) allows signatories to exclude from 
patentability inventions on the basis of morality and the ordre public.158 
Governments may wish to create a disincentive to the development of such 
inventions by precluding patent protection. The message of such a 
 
 
Research: Can Science Resolve the Ethical Problems it Creates?, 33 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 384, 384 
(2005).  
 154. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 101 (2004); see PTO Issues 
Patent on Methods for Cloning Mammals, May Run Afoul of Law, 68 PAT., TRADEMARK, & 
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 485, 486 (2004). 
 155. 149 CONG. REC. H7247 (daily ed. July 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Weldon). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Activists previously had pushed the PTO on the morality of patents related to humans by 
filing an application for an animal-human chimera. The PTO rejected the application on subject-matter 
grounds because the invention embraced a human. See PTO Issues Patent on Methods for Cloning 
Mammals, May Run Afoul of Law, supra note 154, at 486. The PTO recently issued a final rejection of 
this application on the basis that the invention was too closely related to a human, notwithstanding that 
no legal basis exists for that distinction. See Office Action of Patent Application No. 10/308,135 (Aug. 
11, 2004) (final rejection) (on file with author); see also Rick Weiss, U.S. Denies Patent for a Too-
Human Hybrid, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2005, at A3.  
 158. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, art. 27(2) (1995). 
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disincentive, however, is merely a moral expression. Denying patent 
protection does not mean the technology is actually banned. Moreover, 
because the denial of a patent would not prevent these morally 
objectionable technologies from developing, these provisions serve only to 
eliminate the signal of government endorsement. Other incentives operate 
to encourage scientists to develop such technologies, as can be seen in the 
context of cloning humans.159 Thus, the only purpose for such exclusions 
is to allow governments to avoid granting the patent on these controversial 
inventions and to avoid the government’s perceived endorsement or 
encouragement of these morally questionable inventions.  
The public has already become aware of controversial patents, 
confirming the ability of individual patents to communicate information to 
the public-at-large. There has been considerable media coverage of, and 
outcry against, the patenting of animals, genes, and humans generally.160 
As such, patents could serve to communicate a message to the public, both 
gay and straight, that gays and lesbians are inferior or defective in some 
sense. In light of the public nature of patent rights and the already 
demonstrated ability of patents to transmit information beyond simply 
explaining the scope of exclusive rights, patents can have effects similar to 
that of legislation, including expressive impacts.  
2. The Utility Standard: Does a Patent Inform Us What is Normatively 
“Good”? 
While patents and the inventions disclosed therein can intersect with 
morally questionable subject matter, the key aspect of an expressive harm 
is from the government’s assessment that an invention is “good” and 
worthy of a patent. This element is the utility standard of patent law. An 
invention must have utility in order to be eligible for patent protection.161 
Generally, the utility requirement is easy to satisfy: an invention will be 
useful “if it actually works to achieve at least one of its stated 
purposes.”162 The inventor must demonstrate that the invention has only 
 
 
 159. S.J.R. Bostyn, The Prodigal Son: The Relationship Between Patent Law and Health Care, 11 
MED. L. REV. 67, 120–21 (2003). 
 160. See Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 
JURIMETRICS J. 399, 399–400 (1988) (“Although patent law experts and biotechnology companies 
greeted the decision as a welcome and logical extension of existing patent law, the action triggered a 
much less favorable response from the media, a variety of political and religious groups, and some 
members of Congress.”).  
 161. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 162. Gitter, supra note 36, at 1662–63. 
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one use that benefits society, even if there are numerous other uses that 
would be detrimental. The courts and the PTO generally use the utility 
requirement to reject inventions that belie scientific laws, such as a 
perpetual motion machine.163 Only in the chemical context is utility really 
an issue—the mere knowledge of a chemical structure is insufficient for a 
patent unless a use for the chemical is known. For mechanical devices, 
utility is rather simple to demonstrate—the mousetrap either snaps closed 
or it does not. The PTO recently issued guidelines for establishing utility 
to deal with complications arising from the patenting of human genes and 
gene fragments. The standard set in the guidelines is that an invention 
must have a substantial, specific, and credible utility to be eligible for 
patent protection.164 
Historically, the utility requirement also contained a morality 
component: inventions viewed as immoral lacked utility per se and were 
ineligible for patent protection.165 For example, the PTO at one time 
viewed patents on gambling machines as ineligible for patent protection 
because their only use was immoral.166 Moral utility appears to be 
withering away.167 In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,168 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, which had concluded 
the invention lacked utility because its sole purpose was to deceive 
consumers.169 The Federal Circuit distinguished Justice Story’s morality-
based view of utility. Noting that this principle “has not been applied 
broadly in recent years,”170 the court concluded that there was “no basis in 
section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of 
utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the 
public.”171 
 
 
 163. Interestingly, the PTO used to include cures for baldness in this category. See, e.g., In re 
Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826, 829 (C.C.P.A. 1940). 
 164. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 165. See, e.g., Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (“All that the law 
requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or 
sound morals of society. The word ‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction 
to mischievous or immoral.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922). The PTO now does allow 
patents on gambling devices. See Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (PTO Bd. App. Apr. 29, 
1977). 
 167. But see infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text (exploring PTO’s reliance on morality 
post-Juicy Whip). 
 168. 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 169. Id. at 1366.   
 170. Id. at 1366–67. 
 171. Id. at 1368. 
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Consistent with this amoral approach to utility, the PTO has rejected all 
morality-based arguments against patenting human genes. Specifically, the 
PTO rejected the argument that “patents should not issue for genes 
because the sequence of the human genome is at the core of what it means 
to be human and no person should be able to own/control something so 
basic.”172 The PTO reasoned that genes, as a discovery,173 are patentable 
so long as they satisfy the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent—
novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and the disclosure requirements of 35 
U.S.C. § 112.174 Because patents “do not confer ownership of genes, 
genetic information, or sequences,” but instead confer only the right to 
exclude others from utilizing the invention, the risk of an entity “owning” 
someone else’s genes is unfounded.175 The PTO’s approach is neutral and 
scientifically objective: the PTO will apply the statutory standards without 
regard to the moral implications of the underlying invention.  
Utility is an inherently relative concept, however. One person’s 
invention on a drug delivery system could be another person’s suicide 
machine. The patent laws do not define the proper population segment by 
which utility must be addressed. The “at least one use” standard would 
seem to include small, discrete populations. The utility guidelines do not 
elucidate as to whom that one benefit must inure. Is it society as whole? If 
a patented invention could be used harshly against one segment—perhaps 
a minority—should that be viewed as useful, even if the benefit afforded 
to the majority is slight? Is there an implicit cost/benefit analysis that 
should be performed, in that the benefit to society as a whole must be 
greater than the cost to society, or is merely one benefit, regardless of 
other potential costs, sufficient? Present PTO law seems to suggest the 
latter—there need be only one use, regardless of the harms from the 
invention and indeed regardless of whether the harms outweigh the 
benefits. No policy balancing takes place.  
As an administrative matter, the lack of balancing may make sense. 
The PTO is not in a position to assess all of the potential consequences of 
a given invention, whereas, through the disclosures of the patentee, they 
 
 
 172. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
 173. For an argument that genes, even as isolated and purified products of nature, should not 
constitute a “discovery” under the Constitution and Patent Act, see generally Linda J. Demaine & 
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing The Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization 
of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303 (2002). See also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty 
Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2004). 
 174. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 175. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1094.  
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are in a relatively good position to assess the benefits. Thus, 
administratively, the lack of a balancing approach may be efficient.176 As 
patents continue to issue on genes and other aspects of humankind that 
implicate who we are, as opposed to what we do, then perhaps 
reconsideration of the lack of balancing is appropriate, particularly as 
discoveries are made that relate to non-pathological conditions. 
To demonstrate this concern, this Article will consider as a thought 
experiment the implications of patenting a method of altering sexual 
orientation. Suppose that a scientist invents a method of changing the 
sexual orientation of a patient from gay to straight. Such a conversion 
suggests that homosexuality is pathological and should be remedied.177 
The question is whether a method to convert a homosexual to a 
heterosexual satisfies the utility requirement of patent law and accordingly 
should be patentable. To some in the heterosexual community, a method to 
convert gays to straights might be viewed as useful. It would maintain the 
status of heterosexuality as the norm and, for those who are opposed to 
gay rights, it would provide a basis for objecting to legal protections for 
gays and lesbians. In the extreme, there would be a risk of forced 
participation in conversion programs by parents, particularly of under age 
gays and lesbians, or for the use of the technology in utero. Gays and 
lesbians would be further marginalized because their status would now no 
longer be immutable. 
Now suppose that a method to alter sexual orientation is discovered, 
but the effected conversion is only from straight to gay. Would the patent 
system view this invention as satisfying the utility requirement? The 
answer may hinge on the relative nature of the utility requirement. From 
the perspective of the majority, homosexuality is not the norm and thus 
such a conversion would not be useful. This approach would feed the fears 
of the majority of a systemic “conversion” campaign by gays and lesbians 
to recruit straight people into their ranks. Conservative organizations 
would never stand for a grant of exclusive rights for changing a person 
into a gay or a lesbian, and in the current political environment, the 
issuance of such a patent seems highly unlikely. From the perspective of 
gays and lesbians, however, such an invention could be useful. A gay or 
 
 
 176. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 
(2001) (arguing that, given the few patents actually litigated or licensed, devoting more resources to 
the review of patents at the PTO would be wasteful).  
 177. See Larry Thompson, Search for a Gay Gene, TIME, June 12, 1995, at 60–61 (June 12, 1995) 
(“The Rev. Louis P. Sheldon, president of the Traditional Values Coalition in Anaheim, California, 
says that if a biological cause of homosexuality is found, then ‘we would have to come up with some 
reparative therapy to correct that genetic defect.’”). 
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lesbian couple who is having a child, for example, may prefer to have a 
gay or lesbian child as well. To the extent that parents want to see 
themselves in their children, some gay or lesbian parents may prefer to 
have a homosexual child.178 
The utility standard in this case is more perplexing, even though the 
genetics or biological pathways involved with this hypothetical likely are 
the same as the first scenario. The biological processes creating 
predispositions towards homosexuality also likely implicate 
predispositions to heterosexuality. The benefit here would accrue only to a 
small segment of society, although the benefit to that small segment could 
be immense. The majority would seemingly be unharmed, although strong 
political and moral resistance to such technology, and the patent itself, 
would be likely.  
Nevertheless, the patentability of a method to convert heterosexuals 
seems in serious doubt. This point is even more salient if one considers the 
other groups implicated by the potential expressive harms from patents, 
the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics. For example, deaf parents 
very well may prefer to have a deaf child, so such an invention allowing 
them to have a genetically deaf child could be useful to them. It seems 
highly unlikely, however, that the PTO would view an invention that 
ensures a deaf child would be viewed as useful, notwithstanding the value 
to the parents. 
The patentability of these two conversion hypotheticals is not the only 
relevant consideration in assessing the potential impact the patent system 
could have. The relative patentability of these two scenarios also merits 
contemplation. If the patent office were to grant a patent on one but not the 
other, what would be the implications for the patent system and society? A 
modification of this thought-experiment elucidates the potential 
consequences of this concern. Given the two possible scenarios—a 
method to change gays to straights or straights to gays (or, to make people 
hear and make them deaf, to make them dwarfs or of statistically normal 
height, etc.)—four permutations for PTO action follow: (1) grant patents 
for both transformations; (2) deny patents for both; (3) allow patent 
protection for the transformation from straight-to-gay (or hearing-to-deaf, 
etc.); and (4) allow patent protection only for reverse transformation (gay-
to-straight; deaf-to-hearing, etc.). 
 
 
 178. It could also result, of course, in the abortion of a heterosexual fetus. LEVAY, QUEER 
SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 267 (“In fact, there might also be some lesbians who, desirous of having a 
lesbian or gay child, would abort a fetus that was predisposed to become heterosexual.”).  
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Grant both 
Grant patent on gay-to-straight 
Grant patent on straight-to-gay 
Differential grant #1 
Grant patent on gay-to-straight 
Deny patent on straight-to-gay 
Differential grant #2 
Deny patent on gay-to-straight 
Grant patent on straight-to-gay 
Deny both 
Deny patent on gay-to-straight 
Deny patent on straight-to-gay 
a. Grant Patents on Both Gay-to-Straight and Straight-to-Gay 
The first permutation is if the PTO were to allow claims covering 
methods for conversion in either direction. If the PTO were to grant a 
patent on both, then the expressive impact would be more limited. Under 
this scenario, the PTO would interpret the utility requirement to reflect the 
value that either scenario would have to the respective groups. This would 
be a true application of the “single benefit to one” approach that is 
ostensibly the current rule. The grant of the patent here arguably is morally 
neutral and would not be construed as suggesting that the government 
views heterosexuality as superior to homosexuality.  
This seemingly neutral approach could communicate a negative 
expressive message nevertheless. While it is true that under this scenario 
the patent would seem to express indifference towards either straights or 
gays, the societal context must be considered. The neutrality of the 
invention, and its corresponding patent, may not negate the 
marginalization of the technology. The concern for these marginalized 
communities could very well be that the technology, notwithstanding its 
seeming neutral face, will be used disproportionately against them.  
This bias can be seen clearly in the rhetoric surrounding biological 
research into homosexuality. Important with respect to all of these 
investigations is that science is not exempt from biases.179 If the search 
was truly objective, the search would be for “sexual orientation,” but all of 
the investigations are looking for the cause of homosexuality. By 
emphasizing homosexuality, they inherently suggest that homosexuality 
(or any variant from heterosexuality) is outside the norm. The science 
remains inherently hetero-centric, which has significant consequences for 
the potential expressive impact of patents on these processes. Given the 
bias surrounding this research, even a facially neutral technology could 
 
 
 179. Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 339 (“But the image of neutrality . . . is largely a myth 
. . . . Defining what is ‘natural,’ science is readily appropriated as a way to conform individuals to 
institutional values and existing social or political conventions.”).  
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easily be viewed as hostile to the interests of gays and lesbians. Even if 
members of the gay community might choose to use such inventions, it 
does not mean the invention is in fact neutral:  
a heterosexual child might be preferable for reasons that might 
appear most salient to homosexuals themselves in lieu of the 
discrimination they have encountered. The use of a technology by 
people against whom it may discriminate (even if they attempt to 
use it to their benefit) does not establish its neutrality.180 
Thus, even a facially neutral technology can be discriminatory. 
Similarly, the grant of an apparently neutral patent can still express a 
message of discrimination and marginalization to the relevant groups. The 
“utility” standard would be satisfied, reinforcing the idea that 
homosexuality is outside the norm and akin to a pathological condition. 
So, the seemingly neutral “grant to both” may yet inflict an expressive 
harm.  
b. Grant Patents on Neither 
Another option to consider would be that the PTO rejects all variations 
of the invention, deeming them as lacking utility. The PTO could decline 
to issue patents on these processes, resulting in a minimal expressive 
impact. Of course, the PTO must have a basis to reject these applications. 
Seemingly the only basis for rejecting both would be on a morality 
ground, which is disfavored under present law. 
A recent rejection at the PTO office, however, suggests that use of 
morality may yet resurface at the PTO, offering the potential for rejection 
of both inventions. An examiner at the PTO recently rejected an 
application directed to animal-human chimeras, and one of the bases for 
this rejection was utility.181 In her utility analysis, the examiner did not 
limit her consideration to scientific or industrial usefulness. Instead, she 
distinguished the Federal Circuit’s seeming evisceration of moral utility in 
Juicy Whip and drew upon Justice Story’s formulation.182 The examiner 
 
 
 180. Udo Schüklenk, Edward Stein, Jacinta Kevin & William Byrne, The Ethics of Genetic 
Research on Sexual Orientation, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 6, 12 (1997). 
 181. Office Action on Patent Application No. 10/308,135 at 21–24 (Dec. 3, 2002) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Non-final Rejection]; see also Office Action on Patent Application No. 
10/308,135 at 21–22 (Aug. 11, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Final Rejection] (final rejection 
relying on same basis as non-final rejection). 
 182. Non-final Rejection at 21-22. The examiner reasoned that Juicy Whip dealt with the need for 
the patent system “not to displace the police powers of the state or other federal agencies.” Id. at 22. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/2
p573 Holbrook book pages.doc4/30/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE EXPRESSIVE IMPACT OF PATENTS 607 
 
 
 
 
acknowledged that “[t]he question of whether humans should be the 
subject of exclusive patent rights raises grave issues going to the core of 
what a ‘useful’ invention is.”183 In embracing the utility standard in the 
patent statute, Congress was presumptively aware of the moral utility 
doctrine and “did not disavow” it.184 The examiner recognized that utility 
in this context is one of public policy, one that “takes into account the 
common sense of the community.”185  
As such, the examiner concluded that Congress, not the PTO, should be 
the first to address this public policy issue, and that for the PTO to grant 
such a patent would “usurp the power of Congress to speak first to these 
issues.”186 She expressly recognized that “utility,” as simply a technical 
standard, is one infected with public policy: 
The discretion to consider the well-being and good policy of society 
implicit in the statutory term “useful” is properly applied when a 
refusal to grant a patent is necessary to avoid preempting the power 
of Congress to define essential questions of public policy. . . . [T]he 
USPTO would be acting improperly in the place of Congress to “fill 
a gap” in the law if it were to grant a patent covering human beings; 
it acts pursuant to soundly based deference to the constitutionally 
empowered institutions of government in denying such a patent 
application.187 
Thus, in this context, the examiner recognized that “utility” is infused 
with public policy concerns and that consideration of the “community” 
(whoever that community may be) is important. Technically, of course, 
these observations are only those of one particular examiner and do not 
establish PTO policy. Given the intense public scrutiny given this 
particular application, however, it seems highly likely that policymakers at 
the PTO were involved in drafting the office action. The PTO therefore 
has plausible deniability—while effectively an expression of policy by the 
PTO, it is legally only the views of one examiner which cannot be used to 
bind the entire PTO, if the PTO decides to change its stance. Additionally, 
the idea of denying the patent in order to allow Congress to consider the 
issue first is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, where the court allowed the patenting of a life form and 
 
 
 183. Id. at 22. 
 184. Id. at 21–22. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 22–23.  
 187. Id. at 23.  
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noted that it is for the courts to decide patent eligibility in the first 
instance.188 
At a minimum, however, this language shows that the PTO is indeed 
aware of the relativity of utility. Its reference to “community” seems to 
mean the entire U.S. society, but necessarily communities can be of 
varying sizes. What is useful to one community seemingly may not be 
useful, and indeed may be harmful, to another. Thus, the PTO could root a 
decision denying patent protection on all forms of such “conversion” 
technologies.189 The flat denial of patent protection would send a rather 
sharp expressive message that such eugenic-like technologies are not 
properly within the ambit of the patent system. 
c. Differential Grant #1: Grant Patent Only on Gay-to-Straight 
The use of the morality lever could cut in a much more hostile manner 
towards gays and lesbians. The PTO could treat such processes differently 
and afford patent protection for only gay-to-straight conversions or for 
methods of preventing homosexuality. Granting technologies in this 
discriminatory manner undeniably would inflict a clear expressive harm 
on homosexuals. The “usefulness” of the patent is to cure homosexuals, 
reinforcing the view that gays are pathologically flawed. Given the role of 
patents as showing the imprimatur of the government, these grants would 
imply that U.S. government views technologies that convert gays to 
straight as normatively good. The same would be true for the other 
relevant groups—that we view those communities as flawed in a way that 
needs to be corrected. This reality is very stark in the context of the deaf 
and other biologically influenced groups, where patents on technologies to 
cure deafness would send a signal to these groups that they should be 
cured. If the PTO were to explicitly allow patent protection only for these 
methods of curing, then there would be considerable expressive 
consequences.  
 
 
 188. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980). The PTO had denied the patent 
application originally, apparently attempting to use the approach espoused by the examiner here and 
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court. See Bagley, supra note 12, at 486–88. 
 189. Although this part deals with the hypothetical of true “conversion” technologies, even more 
complexities would arise in the real world. What exactly would constitute a “conversion” technology? 
A prenatal test developed to identify the likely sexual orientation of a fetus (or likelihood of deafness, 
dwarfism, etc.) itself is not directly a conversion technology, but that information could easily be used 
to terminate the pregnancy. This issue of classifying the type of technology adds considerable 
complexity to the issue.  
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d. Differential Grant #2: Grant Patent Only on Straight-to-Gay 
The final option in this thought experiment is that the PTO would issue 
patents only on straight-to-gay conversions or the prevention of 
heterosexuality—in other words, “cures” for heterosexuality. If the PTO 
granted a patent on such a method, then value to the gay and lesbian 
community under this view would be recognized. A positive message 
would be sent that recognizes that some members of this community may 
want to have offspring that share their genetic traits. The odds that the 
PTO would indeed allow such a grant seems slim, if not impossible given 
the political consequences of such an act. This point again is more 
poignantly made if we consider the deaf or autistics. It seems unlikely that 
the PTO would view as “useful” processes to guarantee the birth of a deaf 
or high-functioning autistic child.  
These four scenarios afford considerable insight on the potential 
expressive harms from granting patents in this area. Looking at these four 
possible scenarios, the possibility of expressive harm is reduced if the two 
processes are treated the same—denying protection on both or granting 
protection for both. These scenarios are of course hypothetical: they 
assume that the PTO would actually be presented with patent applications 
for both processes simultaneously.  
The reality is, however, that the current system on its face offers no 
opportunity for balancing such concerns, but the PTO’s own words in the 
human-animal chimera application show that it is aware of this issue and 
is willing to rely upon community concerns and morality in assessing 
utility. Its objectivity therefore is over-stated, giving the concerns about 
differential grants of patents involving sexual orientation considerable 
traction.  
3. The Nature and Scope of the Claim 
The first two factors—whether patents are like statutes and the utility 
standard—are essential in assessing whether any expressive 
communication could emanate from the grant of a patent. The remaining 
factors relate more to the strength of such a signal and whether the 
expressive message could be lost in other noise. 
One key aspect of any communication would be the nature of the 
disclosed invention itself and the scope of the patent’s right to exclude. A 
patent claim can be directed to a process, machine, manufacture, or 
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composition of matter.190 Machines and manufactures generally are not 
implicated for inventions relating to biology. Whether the invention is a 
process or method, in contrast to a composition of matter, could affect the 
extent of an expressive message significantly. The above hypothetical 
helps demonstrate this point. If the invention is a method to alter or 
modify sexual orientation, the expressive impact would be greater, 
whereas a claim to a gene or protein that influences sexual orientation 
would be more ambiguous. A method claim must identify a particular 
outcome, which would highlight the purpose of the invention. Method 
claims therefore would inflict expressive harms more directly.  
In contrast, a claim for a composition of matter only covers the 
structure of that compound. The specification will have to identify a use 
for the compound, but biological materials often can have multiple 
functions.191 Originally, scientists believed the human genome could 
contain upwards of 80,000 genes.192 This number, thanks to the Human 
Genome Project, has proven to be a gross overestimation. The current 
estimate is around 25,000 genes.193 The consequence of this relatively 
small set of genes is that a single gene performs numerous functions.194 
Genes that implicate sexual orientation may be relevant in other biological 
processes. The expressive impact of a patent that discloses both a function 
related to sexual orientation and one unrelated to orientation could differ 
from that of a patent directed solely to a gay gene. Particularly, suppose 
the claim is merely to a gene with a given sequence, and the specification 
discloses a variety of functions, one of which happens to be influencing 
sexual orientation. The expressive message would seem to be muted in 
that context given the multiplicity of function.  
The level of muting, however, would not be significant. While a 
compound claim may not produce as strong of a signal as a method claim, 
a claim to a biological product influencing sexual orientation would still 
likely provide a strong signal given the cultural and social context of 
homosexuality. The fact remains that one reason the patent on this gene is 
considered useful is that it influences sexual orientation, again suggesting 
 
 
 190. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 191. See, e.g., Ted J. Ebersole et al., Patent Pools and Standard Setting in Diagnostic Genetics, 23 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 937, 937 (2005). 
 192. RIDLEY, supra note 61, at 5 (“There are probably 60,000–80,000 genes in the human 
genome . . . .”). 
 193. See Anthony L. Komaroff & George Q. Daley, Harnessing Stem Cells, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 
2004, at 54. Previous analyses had suggested 30,000–40,000 genes. See Gitter, supra note 36, at 1633. 
 194. Cf. Gitter, supra note 36, at 1671 (noting the potential for “subsequent researchers later [to 
determine that the DNA segment was involved in other illnesses”). 
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that such knowledge and the potential to modify such genes is a societal 
good. The mere pursuit of this scientific inquiry is infected with prejudice 
and homophobia.195 As one commentator has noted, “there hasn’t been 
one instance in history where the results of etiologic sexual orientation 
research have not been used against gay people. On the contrary, virtually 
every ‘cause’ of homosexuality has been accompanied by attempts to 
‘heal’ gay people.”196 Investigations into the biological origins are not 
truly value-neutral given the context of gays and lesbians in today’s 
society because “the very motivation for seeking the ‘origin’ of 
homosexuality has its source within social frameworks that are pervasively 
homophobic.”197 Thus, even a patent on the gene itself, although arguably 
neutral in application because it could affect both gay and straight sexual 
orientation, is pregnant with an expression of marginalization given the 
homophobic context of society.  
Where this issue may be more important may not be the question of 
whether there is an expressive communication, but whether or not to do 
anything about such communication given that the gene has other uses 
aside from influencing sexual orientation.198 We may simply conclude 
that, given the complexity of genetic science, parsing patent rights on 
possible expressive harms simply is not worth it. 
4. Who is the Inventor or the Owner? 
Unlike legislation, the PTO can only pass judgment on the applications 
presented to it by inventors. This begs the question of whether the identity 
of the inventor could serve to mitigate or exacerbate an expressive signal 
from the granting of a patent. For example, because Hamer is sympathetic 
to gay and lesbian causes, arguably his obtaining a patent on the gay gene 
would not deliver as harsh an expressive impact. In contrast, if someone 
from the National Association for Research and Therapy of 
Homosexuality (NARTH), a group of psychiatrists who still view 
homosexuality as a pathological disorder, were to discover a gay gene, the 
 
 
 195. Udo Schüklenk, Science, ‘Gay Genes’, and the ‘Third Sex’, GAY AND LESBIAN HUMANIST 
(Spring 1997), available at www.galha.org/glh/163/etiology.html.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Schüklenk et al., supra note 180, at 9.  
 198. One possible variation would be to strike references in the patent to the gene’s role in sexual 
orientation. Such a change would be recorded in the prosecution history of the patent and could thus 
express the alternative message—that the government via the PTO does not view genes on non-
pathological conditions as worthy of patent protection in any shape or form. Admittedly, the patent 
would still give protection to the gene, regardless of how it is being used, but the government act of 
striking the utility vis-à-vis sexual orientation would communicate an alternative message.  
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expressive impact could be more harmful. The motivation behind the 
inventor’s technology would differ, and the resulting communication from 
the patenting of the technology could vary depending on the inventor’s 
intent behind developing it.  
Overall, inventor identity likely would not have a significant impact on 
the strength of the signal. The expressive theory articulated here suggests 
the harm is originated by the government’s grant of the patent. As such, 
the identity of the inventor may not matter—the government has expressed 
its view that a gay gene satisfies the utility requirement, notwithstanding 
its relative nature. The mere existence of the patent emphasizes the view 
of gay-as-pathology. Moreover, the inventor’s interest in keeping the 
invention out of unscrupulous hands is almost impossible to maintain. She 
may have the right to exclude others, but the information surrounding her 
invention is disclosed to the public. Indeed, once the patent has expired, 
anyone can use this information, including NARTH. The inventor’s lack 
of control over the information, and eventually the invention itself, also 
suggests that the identity of the inventor may not have a significant effect 
on the expressive impact. 
In fact, it is likely that the identity of the inventor will be irrelevant to 
the gay and lesbian community: 
In addition, the fact that the current wave of scientists working in 
the area are either themselves gay, or are well disposed to gay 
people, tends to diminish anxiety that the research is intended to 
harm the gay community. Nevertheless, some gays and lesbians still 
express the fear that science is likely to harm them, whatever the 
sympathies of the scientists themselves.199 
Thus, the identity of the inventor or owner would have little bearing on the 
expressive harm resulting from the grant of the patent.  
5. The Nature of the Characteristic at Issue 
The potential for expressive harms from patents will also depend on 
how closely the behavior or condition is associated with a person’s 
identity. For homosexuals, generally the link between their orientation and 
their identity is strong and intimate. Similarly, other conditions where the 
link between behavior/condition and identity are strong could include the 
deaf and dwarfism, where these communities do not view their condition 
 
 
 199. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 147. 
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as necessarily pathological or in need of curing. Other conditions may not 
have as strong a link to identity. A patent on aggression, for example, 
would not generate an expressive harm because most people do not define 
themselves as an individual through their aggressiveness. Other possible 
conditions, such as obesity, might fall somewhere in the middle of the 
identity spectrum. At some point, though, such as discovery of genes that 
affect certain ethnic groups more particularly, the significant impact of the 
disease may outweigh expressive consequences of the patent itself. In fact, 
concepts of race and ethnic origin may become more strongly implicated 
as exploration of genetic differences between people continues.  
C. Assessing the Potential for Expressive Harms from Patents 
As genetic and biological research shifts away from conditions that are 
indisputably pathological, patents in this area will increasingly bear on 
what is considered to be good, particularly due to patent law’s utility 
requirement. The above analysis shows that there is considerable potential 
for expressive harms to result from the granting of patents in these 
controversial areas. As with any sort of signal, the strength of the signal 
may vary.200 The fact that signal strength may vary, though, does not 
undermine the fact that the signal exists. There almost certainly will be 
some sort of message of inferiority or pathology communicated to the 
groups impacted by these technological developments. The message is that 
the government, through the grant of a patent, believes that technologies 
that may help eliminate these conditions, and therefore these groups, is 
normatively good.  
In essence, the government is approving privatized eugenics. What is 
considered “normal” versus “pathological,” while arguably objective 
scientifically, is necessarily infected with moral and cultural values.201 
This bias can readily be seen in the context of sexual orientation: the 
search is for a “gay gene,” not “the sexual orientation gene,” even though 
necessarily such a gene would be relevant in the development of a 
 
 
 200. Cf. Long, supra note 7, at 660–63 (discussing noise in signals to investors).  
 201. See Rosario, supra note 54, at 6 (“[T]he ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’—in their very 
quantitative arbitrariness—disguise the cultural and moral values they perpetuate.”); Anne Fausto-
Sterling, How to Build a Man, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 219, 224 (Vernon A. Rosario ed., 
1997) (“Because they represent scientific findings, one might imagine that they contain no 
preconceptions, no culturally instigated belief systems. But this turns out not to be the case. Although 
based on evidence, scientific writing can be seen as a particular kind of cultural interpretation—the 
enculturated scientist interprets nature.”); Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 333 (describing 
“persons at risk” due to genetic condition as “people whose physical condition removed them from the 
class of normalcy”).  
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heterosexual orientation as well as a homosexual one.202 No matter how 
objective any individual method or research may be, political and moral 
considerations will infect the results.203 Consequently, the general public 
would view the issuance of a patent on a gene affecting sexual orientation 
as a patent covering a “gay gene.” Such research is inextricably linked not 
only with what causes homosexuality but also with what it means to be a 
homosexual.204  
The medicalization of homosexuality in the past has been used to 
stigmatize and marginalize homosexuals.205 The threat to these groups of 
eugenic application of these technologies to eliminate them is real.206 
Eugenics conflates science with the moral.207 Consequently, these 
technologies easily can be viewed not only as a threat to the human dignity 
of gays and lesbians but also as a threat to their existence.208 Biological 
 
 
 202. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 221 (“I have never heard of a single instance of a 
heterosexual, whatever problems he may have been facing, inquiring about the nature and origins of 
heterosexuality, or asking why he was a heterosexual, or considering these matters important.” 
(quoting F.E. Kameny, Does Research into Homosexuality Matter?, THE LADDER 14–20 (1965)); 
LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 5 (“What should be emphasized, though, is that seeking the 
cause of homosexuality is really the same thing as seeking the cause of heterosexuality . . . . If ‘gay 
genes’ make a person gay, then ‘straight genes’ make a person straight . . . . When we study 
homosexuality we are inevitably studying heterosexuality also, even if we do not always express it that 
way.” ); Allen, supra note 35, at 251 (“For another, if homosexuality was not viewed as a pathology, 
then we cannot sensibly ask about its cause or origins separate from the causes or origins of 
heterosexuality and sexual practices in general.”). 
 203. Rosario, supra note 54, at 12 (“Despite Hamer[sic] and LeVay’s protests that scientific 
research on homosexuality should and can be ‘objective’ and apolitical, it should be clear that even if 
it adheres to the methods and standards of scientific correctness, such research is inevitably interlaced 
with deeper narratives and hidden motivations that reflect the political climate of the moment as well 
as the personal aspirations of individual researchers.”). 
 204. Id. at 14. 
 205. Margaret Gibson, Clitoral Corruption: Body Metaphors and American Doctors’ 
Constructions of Female Homosexuality 1870–1900, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 108, 108 
(Vernon A. Rosario ed., 1997) (“Through these connections, doctors were able to further marginalize 
and exoticize the female invert or homosexual, and minimize the threat that the existence of such 
individuals might pose to broader beliefs about sexuality, gender, and intimate relationships.”); 
Carlston, supra note 1, at 177 (noting that historians “have suggested how damaging the internalization 
of [the concept of homosexuality as pathology and abnormal] could be to people with homoerotic 
feelings or in homosexual relations”). 
 206. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 85 (“Hanging over the entire field of genetics has been the 
specter of eugenics—that is, the deliberate breeding of people for certain selected heritable traits.”); 
Rosario, supra note 54, at 6; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 171.  
 207. GIBSON, supra note 205, at 111–12 (“Social Darwinism and the start of the eugenics 
movement provided a framework in which to discuss moral issues in an increasingly biological way, 
using the human body not just as a personal unit, but as a representation of the limits to human 
progress and of regression into an animal past.”).  
 208. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 39–40. Indeed, the LeVay findings regarding the brain 
already spurred anti-gay and lesbian groups to attempt conversion methods. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, 
supra note 24, at 134. 
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conversion technologies will undoubtedly be protected by patents, and this 
eugenic potential informs the potential expressive impact of granting 
patent rights in this area. 
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE OPTIONS TO REMEDY THESE EXPRESSIVE 
CONSEQUENCES 
While expressive harms in patent law likely will occur, the mere 
presence of a harm does not mean necessarily that we should deny patent 
protection in these contexts. The harms are a cost—albeit a non-economic 
one209—that would need to be weighed against other potential benefits. In 
some contexts, such as sexual orientation, the benefit of any patent seems 
low, while expressive harm seems high. If the risk of expressive harm is 
viewed as significant, we must explore other options to eliminate that 
harm. For the blind, deaf, dwarfs, and autistics, the reality very well may 
be that the agnostic approach of “granting both” likely will not come to 
pass. This section of the Article will explore possible means to address the 
potential expressive impact of patents, evaluating the benefits and 
downsides to each approach. As this part will show, none of the solutions 
are perfect and each imposes its own consequences. 
A. Do Nothing: Maintain the Status Quo Neutral Approach Towards 
Morality 
The most obvious option would be to do nothing. It might very well be 
that the cost imposed by the expressive harm is not sufficient to require an 
alteration to the patent system in any significant way. The various factors 
above demonstrate that, while communication of a message is likely, the 
strength of that signal may be contingent on numerous factors. As such, 
the communication may be so muted as to not merit changing the status 
quo. If the PTO maintains its agnostic approach and would allow patents 
for both conversions from gay-to-straight and straight-to-gay, then the 
expressive impact would be significantly reduced. If, however, the PTO 
does not treat both as equal, as likely would be the case in the context of 
the blind, deaf, or autistics, then the message would be fairly strong. 
Maintaining a truly morally neutral approach, and not discriminating on 
 
 
 209. Cf. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 100 (“Utilitarians seldom take into account more subtle 
benefits and harms that cannot be easily measured, or which accrue to the soul rather than to the 
body.”).  
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the technology, would be key to minimizing the expressive harm and 
would require no change in policy. 
Patents on inventions that some find objectionable seemingly have not 
created significant moral expressions in the past. For example, there are 
patents on methods of performing abortions, which clearly would 
implicate messages of the government embracing certain technologies.210 
Although these inventions are not directly related to identity the way that 
patents on sexual orientation or other behaviors may be, they could 
support the argument that society has weathered patents on controversial 
technologies previously and can continue to do so. As such, the burden of 
fleshing out patents on technologies creating expressive harms may 
outweigh any potential benefits.  
B. Cease Issuing Patents on Human Genes and Gene Fragments 
If one concludes, however, that the harm inflicted on these groups is 
significant and should be addressed, one approach would be to deny 
patents on all inventions that relate to human genes. Others have called for 
a similar ban because patents inhibit innovation211 or because genes are 
naturally occurring substances ineligible for patent protection.212 The 
potential for expressive consequences adds another basis for objecting to 
these types of patents. 
This approach, however, is both over- and under-inclusive in resolving 
the possibility of expressive harms. A complete ban on gene patents would 
eliminate protection not only for those patents with the potential for an 
expressive harm but also for those that are genuinely directed to conditions 
that need to be cured, such as various cancers or schizophrenia. A 
complete ban would thus be an overly inclusive solution, and indeed might 
create more harm than good by eliminating the patent incentive for 
research into areas that undeniably relate to pathological conditions. 
A ban, moreover, would be under-inclusive. As the discussion of the 
biology of homosexuality demonstrated, many behavioral characteristics 
may not be genetically determined but instead may be influenced by non-
genetic, biological situations, such as in utero hormone levels. The 
burgeoning field of proteomics further shows that the expression of a trait 
 
 
 210. See Thomas, supra note 144, at 580–81. Professor Thomas views these patents as privatized 
regulation that denies access to these technologies, but the grant of the patent could signify 
government endorsement of the technique as well.  
 211. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 698. 
 212. See generally Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 173. 
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may be controlled not only at the genetic level but also at the protein 
level.213 A ban on gene patents alone, therefore, still permits patents on 
various proteins and biological processes, which still have the potential to 
create an expressive harm. Moreover, methods of curing would also seem 
to escape a proscription on gene patents. Thus, while the potential 
expressive harms from patents add some additional support to recent calls 
to stop granting patents on human genes and gene fragments, this 
approach would not adequately solve the problem.  
C. Allow the PTO to Assess Whether the Expressive Impact Outweighs the 
Benefits of Granting the Patent 
Another possibility would be to allow the PTO or the courts to assess 
the expressive impact of a patent in assessing the patent’s validity. The 
PTO would seem to be on the front lines, as it will first encounter these 
patents with expressive or eugenic potential. Examiners, however, are 
persons with technical skills and not necessarily ethical training. They 
would be ill-equipped to grapple with the ethical assessments that these 
applications may present. The PTO could establish an ethics board to deal 
with these issues or other morally questionable inventions. While not a 
panacea, examiners could flag inventions that raise expressive potential, 
which could be reviewed by such a board. The board, to avoid the 
appearance of bias, could be formed of persons not employed by the PTO 
directly.  
Of course, ironically, in trying to assess any potential expressive 
impact from a given patent, the PTO would be memorializing and in fact 
confirming an expressive consideration of patent law. The PTO would be 
saying “yes, we view this as lacking utility or having utility” with 
consideration for expressive harms. This solution could prove to be worse 
than the problem. 
The courts could also reinvigorate the now-moribund morality 
exclusion, and allow for consideration of expressive harms. The courts, 
however, may not be in the best position to make such assessments. 
Indeed, given that the groups who are likely harmed by some patents 
would likely never be infringers themselves, obtaining standing to 
challenge such patents would be a problem.  
 
 
 213. Dan L. Burk, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 586 (2006). 
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D. Define “Utility” as Covering Genes and Biological Processes Relating 
to Pathological Conditions—Patents for Therapy, not Enhancement 
A cleaner, morally neutral approach is necessary for there to be a 
change in the utility standard, either pursuant to Congress or the PTO. An 
invention relating to human biology would have utility only if it served to 
identify or correct a truly pathological condition. While marginally 
“pathological” conditions could create some difficulty, such conditions 
could be tied to the medical profession’s views of what is viewed as 
disease or pathology. Moral considerations would be minimized, and those 
inventions that relate more to behavior and/or identity would be excluded 
from patent protection. 
A potential source for identifying what constitutes “pathological” 
would be the medical community. Psychiatrists and psychologists, for 
example, use the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) in assessing whether a patient has a pathological mental health 
condition.214 Thus, the DSM acts as a catalog of conditions that are viewed 
as pathological, and those that are not. Thus, the field of medicine, and 
particularly the DSM, would be a helpful tool in assessing whether a 
condition is pathological and therefore should be eligible for patent 
protection. This approach could also be articulated as the “therapy versus 
enhancement” approach—protection will be provided for those genetic 
and biological inventions that relate to therapies for diseases but not for 
mere enhancements.215 
There are also problems with this approach. The line between 
therapy/pathology and enhancement is far from clear. The DSM itself has 
proven to be a fluid reference—it has changed over time, and conditions 
within it continually change. For example, the DSM lists attention deficit-
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a disease and prescribes the use of 
drugs to treat this condition.216 But this pathology is recognized only by its 
symptoms, which are arguably simply the tail end of a normal distribution 
of attention levels of children.217 Arguably, this is not a case of using 
 
 
 214. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 47; Allen, supra note 35, at 244 (noting that the DSM is 
“the psychiatric profession’s handbook of recognized pathological behaviors”). The DSM is currently 
in its 4th edition, and is referred to as the DSM-IV. 
 215. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 208–09; see also Markwood, supra note 25, at 478–82 
(discussing regulation of enhancement technologies); Glenn McGee, Parenting in an Era of Genetics, 
27 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 16, 16 (1997) (discussing distinction between therapy and 
enhancement).  
 216. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 47. 
 217. Id. at 47. 
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drugs to cure a pathology—a therapy—but instead to enhance the attention 
level of individuals.218  
What constitutes pathology is often infected by social and cultural 
norms, not simply medical knowledge. The most obvious example is 
homosexuality itself. As discussed above, until the early 1970s, the 
medical community, with considerable internal debate, did consider 
homosexuality to be pathological. Nothing changed in the 1970s with 
respect to homosexuality—instead social norms and views of homosexuals 
changed within the medical community, resulting in it being eliminated as 
a pathological condition.219 The contextual nature of psychological 
disorders, therefore, may result in an ever-moving target of what 
constitutes pathological. 
The medical line of therapy/enhancement could truly break down in the 
context of the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics. The deaf do not 
view themselves as medically pathological, although the hearing 
community would view them as lacking one of the key human senses and, 
thus, possessing a pathological condition. The medical community would 
seem to be more in line with that of the hearing community, risking that 
the use of a medical norm would allow patents that arguably would 
express disfavor to the deaf community.220 A similar argument could be 
made for dwarfs, who have bodies that function entirely normally. They 
are simply statistically far outside the normal range of human height. 
High-functioning autistics can view themselves as simply having different 
social skills, which is not inherently wrong. Arguably, this should not be 
viewed as a pathological condition, but likely the medical community 
would disagree.  
Simply because these distinctions are difficult to make, however, does 
not inevitably mean that we should allow everything to be patented. 
Regulatory agencies other than the PTO are charged with making this 
distinction already.221 The PTO could require the demonstration of a utility 
that is beyond mere enhancement and one that instead is a therapy directed 
to a known pathology. The DSM could remain an effective tool, however. 
While on the margins some conditions may seem close to the line of 
pathology, there are some conditions that universally would be viewed as 
 
 
 218. Id. at 49 (“To classify people in this situation as suffering from a pathology is therefore to 
blur the line between therapy and enhancement. Yet this is exactly the demand that proponents of the 
medicalization of ADHD have made.”). 
 219. Id. at 209. 
 220. See Robert A. Crouch, Letting the Deaf Be Deaf: Reconsidering the Use of Cochlear 
Implants in Prelingually Deaf Children, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 14, 15–17 (1997). 
 221. Id. at 210–11. 
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pathological, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. The DSM would 
at least provide certainty for certain behaviors. 
Currently there is no legal basis for limiting the 
pathological/enhancement distinction to gene-related, biological-related, 
or behaviorally-related inventions. Indeed, under international obligations, 
countries must not discriminate on the basis of technological area, other 
than the exceptions provided for in TRIPS.222 Consequently, the 
redefinition of utility would apply in other contexts, including to basic 
pharmaceuticals. Drugs like Viagra or Claritin might not be eligible for 
patent protection under the therapy/enhancement dichotomy. Whether this 
possibility is good or bad as a policy matter, however, bears further 
exploration. 
The pharmaceutical industry has come under criticism recently for 
failing to devote sufficient resources to particularly relevant drugs, instead 
focusing on the next generation of market-driven (as opposed to health-
care driven) drugs, such as antihistamines. A recent study has shown that 
most new drugs entering the market are not particularly innovative and 
instead are simply follow-up improvements on already existing drugs.223 
There are a number of reasons for this reality: the dependency of drug 
companies on blockbuster drugs;224 the ability of companies to extend 
patent protection effectively on blockbusters through patent and FDA laws 
and regulations;225 and the reduced cost of relying on known drugs in 
proving safety and efficacy.226 Innovation in the pharmaceutical market 
thus seems anchored to existing drugs, many of which are more driven 
toward enhancement as opposed to curing pathologies. 
A new utility standard, therefore, would reduce incentives for 
companies to spend money on “lifestyle” drugs and instead create greater 
incentive for pharmaceuticals and other companies to research drugs and 
biologics directed to more severe conditions. With availability of patents 
curtailed, companies would not have the patent rights to recoup their sunk 
research and development costs. The ex ante incentive to research drugs 
that deal with lifestyle would therefore be dramatically reduced, affording 
the opportunity for drug companies to shift greater resources to finding 
cures for truly pathological conditions. Less money would be spent on the 
 
 
 222. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, art. 27(1) (1995). 
 223. MICHIE HUNT, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RES. & EDUC. FOUND., CHANGING 
PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 3 (2002).  
 224. Id. at 16. 
 225. Id. at 16–18. 
 226. Id. at 16. 
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next generation of Viagra and hopefully more would be spent trying to 
find vaccines for AIDS.227 While this approach is not without its problems, 
it does have the promise of providing a more objective way of avoiding 
the harms presented in this paper. It can be viewed as the “least worst” 
option, but one worth considering. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated the real potential for expressive harms to 
marginalized biologically defined groups, where the patent communicates 
that these biological conditions are in fact pathological instead of merely a 
form of diversity within the human race. There are a variety of options 
presented to deal with this concern, but all of them have their advantages 
and difficulties. None perfectly solves the problem. At a minimum, this 
Article calls for a reconsideration of what we mean by “useful” in patent 
law. 
In fact, the ultimate utility that we may be protecting is that of choice—
allowing persons to determine how best to use these technologies. But 
falling back on choice does not answer the question of why the 
government should be involved in granting patent rights for these 
discoveries. Choice alone as purely “good” is quite debatable in the 
context of privatized eugenics, which the patent system is poised to 
incentivize.228 The right to choose may accompany a considerable cost—
elimination of groups considered outside the norm.229 While the regulation 
of this choice undeniably lies outside of the patent system,230 that system 
need not embrace destructive choices by allocating a given technology as 
 
 
 227. Given the markets for such “lifestyle” drugs, however, it seems unlikely that all research into 
these areas would completely dry up without patent protection. 
 228. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 99–100 (“[W]e should be skeptical of libertarian arguments 
that say that as long as eugenic choices are being made by individuals rather than by states, we needn’t 
worry about possible bad consequences. Free markets work well much of the time, but there are also 
market failures that require government intervention to correct. Negative externalities do not simply 
take care of themselves.”); HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 15, at 302 (“How will we 
distinguish ‘good’ genes from ‘bad’? What traits will be valued and what will be discarded? Who gets 
to choose?”).  
 229. Of course, the ultimate result of genetic research could be that everyone has some sort of 
genetic predisposition, so that “the ‘normal’ population may be reduced to the point at which genetic 
discrimination becomes unfeasible.” Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 337. There may remain 
certain traits, particularly those close to identity, that may be given greater weight over others that do 
not implicate personhood concerns.  
 230. See Dresser, supra note 160, at 424 (recognizing that “fears expressed about animal patenting 
fail to apply to patenting alone; instead, they bear on the broader issue of whether scientists should be 
permitted to manipulate higher animal life at all” and addressing possible regulations without the 
patent system).  
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“useful” regardless of the harm that invention might inflict. The 
government should not be facilitating such activities with the patent 
system.  
The patent system is one of incentives—if an inventor will engage in 
research resulting in a patentable invention, she is rewarded with the 
patent’s period of exclusivity, which allows the inventor to recoup her 
sunk costs and prevents free-riding by competitors. There is no doubt that 
denying patents in this area will not stop research into such technologies—
other public measures would be required.231 Eliminating, or modifying the 
availability of, patent rights in these areas would at least help to mitigate 
these commercial interests and make such innovations less desirable. 
Regardless, though, do we really want the patent system—with the 
approbation of a government-granted right—to incentivize the creation of 
inventions with such powerful expressive harms and enormous eugenic 
potential? Simply because denying patent protection will not stop these 
technologies does not mean that we should, therefore, continue to grant 
these patents and create incentives for harmful and potentially destructive 
discoveries.232 
 
 
 231. Others have already called for public regulation on biotechnology. See FUKUYAMA, supra 
note 16, at 10, 182 (2002). There may be reason to doubt, of course, whether such regulation would 
limit the use of tests to assess homosexuality. See Schüklenk, supra note 195 (“Indeed, why should we 
assume that legislators in homophobic societies would regulate the use of such devices in the first 
place?”).  
 232. Cf. FUKUYAMA, supra note 16, at 11 (“The fact that there are some individuals or 
organizations that violate these rules, or that there are countries, where the rules are either nonexistent 
or poorly enforced, is no excuse for not making the rules in the first place. People get away with 
robbery and murder, after all, which is not a reason to legalize theft and homicide.”).  
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